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theories of value 
Armando Di Filippo* 
If economics is to supply more reliable interpreta-
tions of development in concrete historical cases it is 
essential that it should break through the narrow 
limits within which it has been confined by theories 
of value based on the assumption of general equilib-
rium. T h e conception of value as power proposed by 
the author is aimed specifically at lessening the ri-
gidity of the categories of economic analysis so that 
they can easily incorporate contributions from other 
social sciences. 
The article begins with a critical review of the 
liberal neo-classical and Marxist theories of value 
and distribution, which, in the author's view, offer a 
distorted picture of the economic process and fail to 
throw proper light on the process of formation of 
relative prices or the dynamic genesis of the surplus 
in the development of capitalist societies. On the 
basis of this critique he sketches the outlines of an 
alternative theory, in which economic value is not 
the expression of magnitudes of social labour, or of 
'sovereign' consumer preferences: it simply ex-
presses power. And the specifically economic form 
of power is 'purchasing power', which finds its most 
general expression with the advent of the capitalist 
social order. 
On the basis of the concept of purchasing power 
the author considers other concepts, such as those of 
economic value, income, capital, surplus and so on. 
In the final sections his interest focuses on the con-
cept of the surplus in its different forms —the global 
surplus, the distribution surplus and the entrepre-
neurial surplus— and, in the light of recent proposi-
tions set forth by Prebisch, he raises the question of 
the way in which it relates to crucial aspects of eco-
nomic development, such as the social forms of ap-
propriation of the fruits of technical progress. 




The central argument of this article is that the 
capitalist economic process lacks self-regulat-
ing forces which would guide it towards posi-
tions of stable equilibrium accompanied by a 
socially 'open' distribution of the fruits of de-
velopment. The corollary of this basic assertion 
is that it is the power positions and relations 
arising from the social structure which, in the 
final analysis, determine the form taken by the 
process of capitalist development. 
This inability of the system to achieve po-
sitions of equilibrium in circulation, and equity 
in distribution, has already been pointed out by 
those who view the capitalist economic process 
as being subject to circular and cumulative ten-
dencies which accentuate any existing asym-
metry of power in the social process.1 
In the same way, the idea that the market 
mechanism does no more than express in the 
economic sphere the asymmetries of power 
which stem from the social structure has been 
implicit in many concrete diagnoses and com-
prehensive interpretations drawn up by the 
structuralist economic school in Latin America, 
and has tended to be stated explicitly and more 
emphatically in some more recent contribu-
tions.2 
LThe logical and ideological significance of the con-
cept of stable general equilibrium in economic theory was 
subjected to a lucid critique by Gunnar Myrdal in Econom-
ic Theory and Under-developed Regions (London, Gerald 
Duckworth, 1957). 
2"As a first approximation to reality, we would consid-
er peripheral development as consisting in penetration by 
the technology of the centres, accompanied by changes in 
the structure of society. This changing structure in turn 
affects the kinds of technology introduced and the inten-
siveness and extensiveness with which they are adopted. 
"The structural transformation is varied and complex. 
The changes which occur in the income strata as technolog-
ical penetration brings about a rise in productivity are of 
great importance for our analysis. 
"The strata change according to the rate at which pro-
ductivity increases and the way in which its effects are 
distributed. But as this happens, changes also take place in 
the social, political and organized labour power of the dif-
ferent strata and, consequently, in the relations between 
them. 
"Now, the power relations which derive from the 
structure of society ultimately determine the distribution of 
income, and the pattern of this distribution conditions the 
penetration of technology and the ensuing rise in produc-
tivity." Raúl Prebisch, "A critique of peripheral capital-
ism", CEPAL Review, No. 1 (first half of 1976), p . 21. 
78 CEPAL REVIEW No. 11 / August 1980 
In practical terms, this particular view of 
the capitalist process suggests the need for ap-
propriate machinery for control by society ca-
pable of subordinating the different forms of 
power to the broader aims of social develop-
ment and human advancement The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights contains perhaps 
the most significant succinct expression of 
those aims. 
Curiously, however, the prevailing eco-
nomic theories do not contain categories of 
analysis whereby this outíook on the world can 
be fully reflected. The two schools of thought 
with greatest present influence have develop-
ed a conception of the market and of economic 
value which is inadequate to describe how the 
power positions which stem from the social 
structure are specifically reflected in economic 
terms. 
For very different reasons, based on their 
contrary views of the capitalist social order,3 
both Marxian and neo-classical liberal econom-
ic theory have assumed that the economic sys-
tem possesses self-regulating mechanisms 
which guide it to positions of general equilib-
rium. Each theory, in its discussion of economic 
value, attempts to explain the structure of rela-
tive prices which should prevail in conditions 
of general equilibrium in fully competitive 
markets. 
Marx developed a view of the economic 
process which is restricted to highlighting the 
'fundamental contradiction' of the system, ex-
pressed in the irreducible class antagonism be-
tween the capitalists who own the means of 
production and the dispossessed workers who 
have only their own labour power. The labour 
theory of value states that value is created 
through the application of living labour in the 
production sphere. In the sphere of circulation, 
i.e., that of the markets, no-one can extract more 
value than that which is incorporated in his 
product, and the logical foundations of this law 
of value make it necessary to proceed from con-
ditions of general equilibrium. If the operation 
of the market actually corresponded to the the-
3 On the subject of the theories of integration and con-
flict, see Jorge Graciarena, Poder y Clases Sociales en el 
Desarrollo de América Latina (Buenos Aires, Paidos, 
1966), appendix 1. 
ory and law of value formulated by Marx, the 
only asymmetry of power which would make it 
possible to appropriate a surplus would be that 
arising from the irreducible antagonism be-
tween capitalists and wage earners. In this way 
Marx succeeds in giving expression, in his fun-
damental economic categories, to the dialecti-
cal dichotomy he perceives in the dynamics of 
the social process. The market—the context in 
which private owners negotiate— thus consti-
tutes a kind of 'epiphenomenon' or projection 
of capitalism, and ought to disappear once this 
social order, which is regarded as intrinsically 
unjust, is left behind. 
The neo-classical version of the liberal 
theory is restricted to translating into economic 
terms the basic idea that, in seeking their own 
personal advantage, men will behave in such a 
way that by virtue of natural tendencies which 
are latent within the social system itself, they 
can achieve stable positions of general equilib-
rium and equity. The marginal utility theory of 
value, formulated in circumstances of perfect 
competition, meticulously eliminates all the 
heterogeneities or asymmetries which might 
produce different positions of power. In cir-
cumstances of general equilibrium, each con-
sumer obtains maximum utility and each factor 
of production receives remuneration which is 
equivalentto the marginal value of its contribu-
tion to production. Consequently, these two 
schools of thought formulate their conceptions 
of the workings of the market and economic 
value in order to place particular emphasis on 
their underlying views of the nature and opera-
tion of the capitalist social order. 
According to Marx, the market sanctions and 
reproduces a fundamental contradiction, of 
which the market itself is an important expres-
sion. The recommended course of action is to 
exacerbate this fundamental contradiction and 
eliminate by revolutionary means not only the 
capitalist social order, but also the market 
mechanism, which is the expression of that or-
der in the economic sphere. 
The neo-classical liberals, for their part, 
draw a diametrically opposite practical conclu-
sion. The market sanctions and reproduces 
consensus, integration, equilibrium, harmony 
and other virtues inherent in the very nature of 
the social process. The practical conclusion, 
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accordingly, is that this beneficent process 
should be interfered with a little as possible, 
and that the fundamental role in the allocation 
of resources should be left to the market, 
In the one case, when the trumpets of the 
dialectical apocalypse sound the system will 
collapse, and the market mechanism will disap-
pear with it. In the meantime further analysis of 
its operation is pointless, since the theory of 
value furnishes us with the basic knowledge 
required. 
In the other case, the market does no more 
than express the virtues of a social order which 
is 'naturally' fair and progressive. Any interfer-
ence with its inherent laws should therefore be 
eliminated. 
Fundamentally, both views of the role of 
the market are distorted because they reflect 
two equally extreme approaches to the opera-
tion of the social system, and, as we shall see 
below in greater detail, each theory demands 
—though for very different reasons— that the 
concept of general equilibrium should be 
placed at the centre of its field of analysis. 
There is another point of convergence be-
tween the two views: their scepticism regard-
ing the viability and desirability of efforts to 
devise machinery whereby society can control 
the different forms of power which are wielded 
in the social structure. In the first case, the 
scepticism is based on the inexorable need for a 
prior radical transformation of the system, 
whi le in the second case the scepticism reflects 
faith in its purely spontaneous action, which 
should not b e tampered with. 
Let us now examine more precisely how 
these views of the world 'infiltrate' into eco-
nomic theory via its basic categories of analysis. 
1. Marx and his labour theory of value4 
T h e entire conception of history which pre-
sides over Marx's work gives a special place to 
the internally antagonistic dynamism which 
4Strictly speaking, for Marx commodities have a value 
in an 'absolute ' sense expressed in terms of the social la-
bour t ime they contain. Because it is purely a definition, 
this proposition cannot be disproved empirically, and it is 
profoundly rooted in Marx's view of the world. The concept 
of social labour in Marx has philosophical, ethical and so-
governs the structuring of social classes, and 
the way in which this conflictive process estab-
lishes relations of mutual causality with the 
rate and form of development of the productive 
forces. 
His acute interpretations of the economic 
process were inevitably coloured by his 'pre-
analytic vision', which included among its fea-
tures the dialectically antagonistic nature of 
capitalist development, and the inexorable rev-
olutionary advance towards a new social order, 
initially under the dictatorship of the proletari-
at. 
His economic theory had to include in its 
basic analytical categories this central struggle 
be tween capitalists and wage earners and, 
more generally, between the owners of the 
means of production and the dispossessed 
workers. 
The working class, which for Marx was the 
victim of an intrinsically unjust system, was in 
his eyes subjected to social relations which in-
volved exploitation and which could only be 
abolished through a revolutionary victory over 
the capitalist social order. 
The overwhelming force of Marx's mes-
sage lay in the fact that he succeeded in trans-
lating this view into the central categories of his 
theory. In the economic sphere, his labour 
theory of value constitutes the analytical ex-
pression of this view of the world. 
Marx's theory of value —with its 'law' of 
the exchange of equivalents— fulfils at least 
three basic functions designed to make his rev-
olutionary message clear. Firstly, it is the basis 
for his theory of surplus value as the expression 
of a phenomenon of exploitation. Secondly, it 
enables him to eliminate from his field of anal-
ysis any other asymmetry of power which 
cial implications which go far beyond his conception of the 
capitalist economic process. The present article contains a 
critical analysis of his theory of value as a scientific hypoth-
esis designed to explain the process of formation of relative 
prices and the genesis of the capitalist surplus. Hence the 
need for critical examination of the 'law of value' with its 
claim to be a norm regulating market circulation in a 'pure 
type ' of capitalist system. This demarcation for the pur-
poses of analysis implies no underestimation either of the 
value which may ethically be ascribed to social labour, or of 
its importance in the historical transformation of human 
society. 
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might distract attention from the above-men-
tioned fundamental antagonism expressed in 
the form of a dichotomy. Thirdly, it highlights 
the common class interests both among work-
ers and among 'capitalists', and minimizes the 
asymmetrical power positions which may con-
ceivably arise within their respective class po-
sitions. This means of focusing his analysis is 
not a 'deliberate tactic' designed to distort or 
simplify the power struggles in a capitalist soci-
ety, but a natural result of his view of the world, 
and of his desire to highlight analytically what 
for him was the fundamental contradiction of 
the capitalist social order. 
Since we do not subscribe to the dialectical 
inevitability of the total and drastic replace-
ment of the capitalist social order and all the 
institutions associated with it, it is perhaps de-
sirable to broaden the field of observation in 
order to throw light on those aspects of the 
social structure which remain unclear in Marx's 
analysis. Let us then, analyse the three features 
mentioned above. 
In the first place, his theory of value consti-
tutes the foundation of his theory of surplus 
value as the expression —in terms of economic 
value— of the phenomenon of exploitation. For 
Marx, only living labour creates value; by 
means of living labour the worker creates a new 
value and transfers to the commodity the value 
contained in the means of production he uses. 
Although there is no explicit formulation on an 
ethical level, surplus value is ultimately view-
ed as the expropriation of the unpaid labour of 
others. This asymmetry of power appears not in 
the market, where the commodity of 'labour 
power' is remunerated in accordance with the 
law of value, but in the use of this labour power, 
which makes possible the process of creating 
new value. The capitalist uses the labour pow-
er whose temporary services he has legitima-
tely acquired, and appropriates the fruits of that 
use. This appropriation is legitimated by the 
institution of private ownership of the means of 
production, of the services of the labour force 
and of the products created by these human and 
material means of production. In this way Marx 
performs the feat of reconciling the phenome-
non of exploitation with the application of the 
exchange of equivalents in the sphere of the 
market. 
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In the second place, this feat enables him 
to exclude from his field of analysis any other 
asymmetry of power which might distract at-
tention from the fundamental antagonism ex-
pressed in the form of a dichotomy. This is the 
function of the law of value. If in conditions of 
general equilibrium the exchange of equiva-
lents must necessarily obtain in the market, 
then the only asymmetry of power which need 
concern us in explaining surplus value —the 
expression of the surplus in economic value— 
is that which becomes crystallized in the ex-
ploitation of the labour force. This argument 
places the owners of the means of production as 
a group on one side of the fence, and the dispos-
sessed workers on the other.5 
This brings us to the third point: that the 
theory of value is formulated —whether delib-
erately or not— in such a way as to highlight the 
common interests of the owners of capital, on 
the one hand, and those of the working class, on 
the other. 
The theory speaks of abstract and unskil-
led labour, performed with an average degree 
of intensity and in average technical conditions 
corresponding to a specific period. The con-
cept of abstract labour is independent of the 
specific skills of each worker which effect the 
use value of the products, and relates only to a 
purely quantitative expenditure of time on un-
skilled labour. One of the weakest theoretical 
points in Marx's reasoning is his subsequent 
distinction between 'skilled' and 'unskilled' la-
bour. 
Marx explicitly recognizes that skilled la-
bour is the product of labour power which con-
tains a higher exchange value —it is more 'ex-
pensive' in terms of the social labour time re-
quired to produce it— and generates more 
Valuable' labour per unit of time. 
In drawing this distinction Marx abandon-
ed the time spent on unskilled labour as the 
only unit of measurement and returned to the 
5 I t should be reiterated that this manner of theorizing 
is designed to distil the purest expression of the move-
ments and processes which are characteristic of a capitalist 
form of production. However, this high level of abstraction 
—legitimate in methodological terms— is not always un-
derstood by his more enthusiastic readers, who seek to 
apply its categories uncritically to historically more com-
plex realities. 
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qualitative characteristics of the labour ex-
pended in that time. Since there are innumer-
able 'degrees of complexity' of labour, the cal-
culation is ultimately completed in a practical 
manner, using the differences in wages which 
originate from the concrete dynamics of the 
labour power markets. 
Marx recognizes this 'problematical' point, 
and forms his concept of an industrial reserve 
army, whereby the introduction of technical 
progress which economizes on labour power 
makes it possible to counter the greater trade 
union power which stems from a real or artifi-
cial shortage of labour power, so that the prices 
and the values of labour power tend to coin-
cide. In this way the 'value' of labour power 
depends not only on the time required to repro-
duce it, but also on concrete market considera-
tions linked to technical or social positions and 
relations which confer power. These relations 
and positions have to do with the distribution of 
technical progress in the production sphere 
and the distribution of wage incomes in the 
sphere of circulation. 
The uneven distribution of technical prog-
ress, for example, is particularly severe in the 
societies of the periphery, giving rise to a situa-
tion of technological heterogeneity which con-
tradicts the assumption of average technical 
conditions required for the operation of the 
' law' of value. 
It must therefore be concluded that the 
value of labour power cannot be calculated in 
terms of time spent on abstract labour, but must 
be calculated in concrete monetary units. Nev-
ertheless, since it is essential to know the value 
of labour power and the value of the means of 
production it uses in order to calculate the val-
ue of any other commodity, these difficulties 
vitiate Marx's entire theory of value. 
We may therefore conclude that the ex-
change value of all commodities depends on 
the initial distribution of technical progress 
and monetary income, and can be expressed 
only in terms of money. 
T h e socialist planners accept on a practi-
cal level what they would not be prepared to 
accept in theory. Bettelheim, for example, has 
the following to say concerning the use of mon-
ey in the centrally planned economies. Al-
though the quotation is rather long, it is worth 
reproducing in full. 
"In a planned economy based on collec-
tive ownership of the means of production, the 
work performed by each person is directly so-
cial work. Money, therefore, no longer plays 
the role that it plays in a private-property econ-
omy of showing to what extent a given kind of 
production is socially useful. 
"Under these conditions, one may ask one-
self why it is necessary to carry out economic 
calculation in terms of money, and why it is not 
possible to make this calculation directly in 
hours of labour, all of these being socially use-
ful. 
"This question has given rise to numerous 
discussions, especially among Soviet econo-
mists. It emerges from these discussions that 
what makes monetary calculation indispens-
able in the first stages of development of plan-
ned economy is the non-uniform nature of the 
labour expended. As Ostrovityanov says: 'This 
non-uniformity results in one hour of one work-
er's labour not being equal to one hour of an-
other's. It is thus that the simple calculation of 
social labour, directly in units of production or 
of labour time, is not enough, and that it is 
essential to retain reckoning in money, for it 
resolves the different aspects of social labour, 
non-uniform in character, in terms of a single, 
abstract labour'. 
"The non-uniformity of labour shows itself 
either in the form of differences between skil-
led and unskilled labour, between mental and 
physical labour, or in the form of differences in 
productivity resulting from the different tech-
nical conditions (Bettelheim's underlining) 
under which one and the same type of labour 
can be expended (diversity of equipment be-
tween different enterprises in one and the 
same branch of production). ',fi 
Thus Bettelheim makes it unnecessary for 
us to raise the question of the heterogeneity of 
the production structure and the independent 
importance which stems from the distribution 
of technical progress (expressed in the form of 
the instruments used in production and in 
6Charles Bettelheim, Studies in the Theory of Plan-
ning (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 79-80. 
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workers ' skills) and of money incomes in deter-
mining the structure of relative unit costs and 
prices. 
However, in that case it is necessary to ask: 
if differences in workers' skills and technical 
progress cannot be expressed in the form of 
hours of work, what criteria are used to make 
the calculation in money terms? 
It is obvious that in the socialist countries 
too there is a distribution of monetary income 
and technical progress —both in the form of 
tools and in the form of workers' skills—which 
corresponds to the power positions and rela-
tions characteristic of those socio-political sys-
tems. Consequently, money is used because it 
represents the only objectification and all-em-
bracing measure of the general purchasing 
power expressed in the markets for labour 
power and consumer goods. The existence of 
these markets —for that is what they are in 
strict terms— is essential for the functioning of 
the socialist economies. 
Technological heterogeneities between 
branches of production also introduce diffi-
culties in the law of value. Marx develops his 
analysis of value within a context very similar 
to that which a neo-classicist of the marginal 
utility school would term perfect competition. 
In particular, he assumes a tendency for the 
rate of profit to become uniform, which implies 
technical and economic conditions that permit 
appropriate transfers of capital, and of the hu-
man and material resources mobilized by capi-
tal, from activities where rates of profit are low-
er to those where they are higher. 
Here Marx faces a theoretical difficulty to 
some extent related to the phenomenon of tech-
nological heterogeneity discussed by Bettel-
heim in the above quotation. Once the average 
value of labour power and the institutionally 
sanctioned length of the working day have 
been established, the average rate of surplus 
value is also determined for the whole econom-
ic system. 
Now, since there is no reason for the organ-
ic composition of capital to be the same in all 
the branches of production, whereas on the 
above assumptions the rate of surplus value 
must necessarily be the same, these conditions 
would seem to be incompatible with the equal-
ization of the average rate of profit, or, alterna-
tively, with the application of the law of value. 
Marx endeavours to overcome this difficulty by 
recourse to the concept of 'production prices'. 
These prices of goods are established in such a 
way that the share of each owner of capital in 
the total surplus value produced as a result of 
industrial activity as a whole is proportional not 
to the value of his variable capital, but to the 
value of his total capital. To put it more clearly, 
the overall average rate of profit is calculated, 
and then the total surplus value is 'distributed', 
allocating an equal share to each capitalist re-
gardless of the organic composition of his capi-
tal (the ratio between the value of constant cap-
ital and the value of variable capital). 
Given a certain rate of surplus value which 
is the same for all branches, the rate of profit 
calculated in values will be lower in those 
branches where the organic composition of 
capital is higher. Consequently, the equaliza-
tion of rates of profit implies a transfer of sur-
plus value from the sectors with a lower organic 
composition to those which use a proportion-
ately greater value of constant capital. 
This solution to the problem adopted by 
Marx involves a violation of the law of value, 
and is incompatible with the equilibrium —in 
terms of values—of his models of reproduction. 
Other writers, using more complicated algebra-
ic methods,7 have proposed solutions designed 
to ensure logical consistency between the law 
of value and the application of 'production 
prices' . A warning is necessary, however, that 
these solutions generally appear to be based on 
a static approach implicit in the solution of any 
system oi simultaneous equations. 
In addition to this methodological aspect, 
however, the general economic significance of 
this difficulty must be considered. Once the 
rate of surplus value has been determined for 
the entire economic system, it will be the tech-
nically more advanced branches which —in 
value terms— record the lowest rates of profit. 
In order to achieve the overall average rate of 
profit, they must sell at 'production prices' 
which involve the appropriation of a proportion 
7 For a simple and concise exposition of this subject, 
see Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development 
(New York, 1942), chapter VII. 
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of the 'external' surplus value. Hence the intro-
duction of technical progress and the raising of 
the productivity of human labour —which are 
associated with a rise in the organic composi-
tion of capital— has the result that the techni-
cally more advanced firms must receive a kind 
of 'subsidy' from the technically more back-
ward firms, which transfer to them part of their 
surplus value. The least that can be said of this 
process is that it is enveloped in a kind of aura 
of unreality. 
In the final analysis, the cause of this lack 
of realism must be sought in the supposedly 
open appropriation of the benefits of the in-
creased productivity of living labour. An in-
crease in the organic composition of capital 
leads to a rise in the productivity of living la-
bour: more units of output per man-hour. This 
decl ine in the share of living labour in each 
commodity must be transferred to the unit cost 
of each good, which in terms of living labour 
will also fall. However, in that case why econo-
mize on living labour by investing in machin-
ery if the higher productivity must be transfer-
red through a drop in prices to the other con-
sumers? The entrepreneur must bear the in-
creased costs of a higher organic composition of 
capital, yet cannot enjoy its benefits.8 One of 
the principal purposes of this article is precise-
ly to demonstrate that in practice there is no 
open appropriation of the benefits of technical 
progress, and that therefore the law of value is 
not fulfilled either in a 'direct' manner or in a 
'transformed' manner through production 
prices. An attempt will also be made, following 
a recent argument put forward by Prebisch, to 
set out the theoretical reasons why the partially 
or totally closed appropriation of the benefits of 
increased productivity is inherent in the very 
logic of capitalist economic development.9 
sMarx obliquely recognizes the existence of an extraor-
dinary surplus value enjoyed by the innovating entrepre-
neur until such time as the technical advance introduced 
spreads throughout the branch. However, this surplus val-
ue, the result of the difference between the 'individual' and 
the 'social' value of the commodity, is a phenomenon of 
disequil ibrium that has nothing to do with the stable 
sources from which, according to Marx, the rise in the rate 
of surplus value derives. 
9 See sections V and VI below. 
2. The neo-classicists and their marginal 
utility theory of value 
In order to understand the neo-classical con-
cept of equilibrium, it is necessary to take as a 
starting point the marginal utility theory of val-
ue, according to which the relative prices of 
consumer goods are proportional to marginal 
preferences with respect to those goods. 
I t is also assumed that these preferences 
make it possible for each consumer to achieve 
maximum utility, satisfaction or welfare; ex-
pressed in different terms, this means that con-
sumers prefer to buy the goods which provide 
them with greatest utility or satisfaction, and 
select their purchases with the aim of maximiz-
ing such satisfaction. 
It is assumed that each consumer is famil-
iar with the goods which are offered in the 
market and draws up his scale of preferences 
independent ly of his monetary income and the 
relative prices of the different goods. If this 
were not the case, any change in his monetary 
income or in relative prices would alter his 
scale of preferences. In other words, whatever 
his specific income in money terms, and what-
ever the specific relationship between the rela-
tive prices of the commodities, each consumer 
has defined an exhaustive set of preferences for 
any level of income and any relative price 
structure. In the neo-classical jargon, each con-
sumer defines his own indifference map inde-
pendently of his monetary income and the 
structure of relative prices of goods. 
Hicks says on this point that "the objects 
bought and sold need not be consumers' goods, 
or they need not all be consumers' goods; the 
necessary condition is only that they should be 
objects of desire, which can be bought and sold, 
and which can be arranged in an order of pre-
ference (an indifference system) which is itself 
independent of prices" (Hicks's underlining).10 
In other words, the consumer (or, more 
generally, the purchaser) has a scale of prefer-
ences which is sufficiently extensive to indi-
cate what quantity of each good he wishes to 
purchase for each possible price. However, a 
">J. R. Hicks, Value and capital, 2nd ed. (Oxford, OUP, 
1946>, p. 55. 
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distinction must be made between preference 
and satisfaction. If a consumer's monetary in-
come is very low, the quantities that he prefers 
to buy at each price are not those which leave 
him satisfied, but those which, on the basis of 
his structure of preferences, correspond to his 
overall purchasing power. To put it briefly, 
each consumer's demand schedule indicates 
preferences backed by purchasing power. This 
consumer is 'in equilibrium' with respect to 
each good ii'foragiven relative price the quan-
tities he wishes to buy are the same as those 
which he actually can buy." 
If we assume that the individual demand 
and supply schedules for this good can be ag-
gregated, the equilibrium price of each good in 
the market will be the price at which the quan-
tities that all purchasers wish to purchase are 
the same as the quantities that all the suppliers 
wish to sell. 
To pu t it more briefly, market equilibrium 
is achieved when the quantities sought are 
equal to the quantities realized with respect to 
a given price. 
It should be noted, however, that general 
equil ibrium in all consumer goods markets can 
b e perfectly compatible with a situation in 
which a high percentage of the population is 
literally dying of starvation. For these weak, 
starving consumers too one could predicate an 
'equil ibrium' whereby the quantities which 
—bearing in mind their limited budgets— they 
'wish ' to buy are the same as those which the 
suppliers wish to sell. 
Obviously, a preference backed by pur-
chasing power is not the same thing as a prefer-
ence tout court. A purchaser who completely 
lacks purchasing power is not a purchaser, but a 
beggar. 
Hence, an economically viable preference 
presupposes purchasing power. And standing 
beh ind this apparently psychological phenom-
enon of preferences, there is a social phenome-
non of power (or impotence) which is not at all 
psychological. 
1 '"The equilibrium condition is that the rate at which 
the individual is willing to substitute be equal to the rate at 
which he can substitute Y for X", Milton Friedman, Price 
Theory: a Provisional Text (Chicago, Aldine Publishing 
Company, 1962), p, 40. 
If a poor man is given only sufficient mon-
ey to feed himself at a minimum level of biolog-
ical subsistence, the neo-classical economist 
will find that the poor man has 'preferred', at 
that price, to acquire a certain quantity of food. 
If on the basis of their money incomes all pur-
chasers of food wish to purchase exactly the 
quantity that suppliers wish to supply in the 
market at that price, our poor man will be in-
formed that he is 'in equilibrium'. 
In short, the neo-classical concept of equi-
librium considers the distribution of personal 
income as an exogenous and constant datum, 
and ignores the overall levels of satisfaction or 
welfare which stem from that distribution for 
each individual. The fact that, within his bud-
getary limitations, each purchaser seeks maxi-
mum utility according to his scale of prefer-
ences does not mean that he will feel satisfied, 
whatever the meaning that may be attached to 
that expression. The point of interest for this 
school of theory is that equilibrium is deter-
mined, in the sense that the quantities and 
prices which compose it are unequivocally 
fixed, as a consequence of the fact that, on the 
basis of his scale of preferences, each purchaser 
seeks maximum utility compatible with his 
budget. The fact that this maximum may for 
him represent starvation is a distributive aspect 
which the theory of demand does not take into 
consideration. 
This in no way means that neo-classical 
economics lacks a distribution theory. Such a 
theory relates to the remuneration paid for ser-
vices rendered by the owners of the factors of 
production. It is assumed that the remunera-
tion paid to each factor of production —strictly 
speaking, to its owner— is equivalent to the 
value of the marginal product stemming from 
the participation of the factor. 
Accordingly, remuneration paid to the 
owners of the factors of production —in other 
words, the functional distribution of income— 
depends on, and is equivalent to, the value of 
the marginal product derived from their use. 
The value of this marginal product is in turn 
determined in the light of the consumers' 
scales of preferences. In this way the neo-clas-
sicists succeed in reversing the logic of the 
central argument: rather than the personal dis-
tribution of income determining the behaviour 
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of the market, it would seem that the behaviour 
of the market determines the functional distri-
but ion of income. The missing link for the neo-
classicists is the connexion between the per-
sonal distribution of income and the composi-
tion of demand. 
When each owner oí a factor oí production 
—say, each labourer as the owner of his labour 
power— receives remuneration equivalent to 
the value of his contribution to the marginal 
product, the neo-classical theory postulates 
that, in conditions of perfect competition, the 
factor markets are in stable equilibrium. It has 
already been observed that, even if this func-
tional distribution of income signifies extreme 
poverty for certain recipients of income, this is 
an aspect which falls outside the neo-classical 
approach. Each 'factor' is assigned a marginal 
value equivalent to that which it contributes, 
and this proposition makes it possible to insin-
uate the subtle fallacy that the process involved 
is an equitable one. 
In the above-mentioned conditions of per-
fect competition, any type of technological 
change which reduces average and marginal 
uni t costs for each possible level of product in 
the long term will feed through to prices. This 
means that in long-term stable equilibrium any 
innovation which raises the productivity of the 
factors spreads to all competitors, eliminating 
extraordinary profits and ensuring a position of 
general equilibrium where average costs, mar-
ginal costs and unit prices are equal. These 
conclusions, which are specific to the micro-
economic theories relating to partial equilibri-
um, involve the logic of a system where extraor-
dinary profits cannot exist and where —given 
the relative availability of factors— any intro-
duction of technical progress is 'openly' appro-
priated by a decline in unit prices in the branch 
concerned. This mechanism ensures that no 
extraordinary profits or surpluses exist which 
cannot b e explained by the theory of marginal 
productivity. 
In order for there to be a situation of gener-
al equilibrium, it is necessary that in each en-
terprise 'extraordinary profits' should be nil. 
Then , starting from a position of general equi-
librium, the economic process could reproduce 
itself indefinitely in identical form. We will 
now endeavour to show that, without perfect 
competition, there can be no stable general 
equilibrium. 
In oligopolistic conditions, for example, 
the profits of the oligopolistic enterprises will 
be the losses of the firms which operate in com-
petitive conditions. According to Say's law, at 
the macro-economic level supply creates its 
own demand. This idea can be understood in 
the sense that production at factor cost gener-
ates incomes whose value is the exact counter-
part of the value of supply in real or physical 
terms. If the physical composition of supply 
and demand coincide ex ante, this overall value 
should permit the complete disposal of the fi-
nal goods which make up the product. Howev-
er, as the value of the income generated is 
equal to the value of the product at factor cost, 
no 'extraordinary profits' will exist at the mac-
ro-economic level. In this way, the profits of 
enterprises which are monopolistic (or oligo-
polistic, or whatever term might be chosen to 
describe those which are best placed in the 
market structure) will have to be secured at the 
expense of the enterprises which do not share 
their privileged position. Within this 'zero-sum 
game' , in which the profits of some can only be 
obtained from the losses of others, the tenden-
cy towards stable general equilibrium will 
have become transformed into a recurrent dis-
equilibrium in which the initial asymmetries 
are accentuated. Left to its own 'internal logic', 
the system would reproduce the conditions of 
disequilibrium in a circular manner, recalling 
the processes of cumulative change suggested 
by Myrdal. Without stable general equilibrium 
it is not possible to postulate stable partial 
equilibrium, at least under the static conditions 
analysed here. 
An economic system governed by general 
market equilibrium and the open appropriation 
of the benefits of productivity requires, both for 
the neo-classical economists and for Marx, stat-
ic conditions of perfect competition which dis-
tort the concrete dynamics observed in the eco-
nomic development of the capitalist societies. 
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II 
General purchasing power and the nature of value 
1. Determination of value in barter conditions 
In general, purchasing power is one of the 
many social forms of power, since it enables 
those who possess it to appropriate objects 
owned by others. Coercion, in the form of vio-
lence or the threat of violence, may, for exam-
ple, confer purchasing power on the stronger to 
the detr iment of the weaker. 
When violence is eliminated from the pic-
ture, we may assume an abstract and hypotheti-
cal barter situation. Let us suppose that a farm-
er regularly exchanges 50 units of cereal with a 
herdsman for 10 head of cattle; in this case, the 
purchasing power which each unit of cereal 
secures for the farmer is one-fifth when expres-
sed in head of cattle, while the purchasing pow-
er which each head of cattle confers on the 
herdsman, expressed in units of cereal, is 5. 
If we rule out any means of obtaining com-
modities without giving something in ex-
change —using violence, threats or persua-
sion— the only way of possessing commodities 
for exchange is to produce them first. And since 
the exchanges occur with a given frequency in 
t ime —for example, at monthly fairs— the num-
ber of units offered in each barter process will 
represent equal periods of time of living labour 
performed by each party, assuming/or the sake 
of simplicity that each offers his entire produc-
tion because no-one consumes what he pro-
duces or produces what he consumes. If in ad-
dition we assume rudimentary technologies, 
where negligible use is made of accumulated 
labour and where the entire process depends 
almost exclusively on living labour, the total 
quantit ies of each commodity offered by each 
participant will contain more or less equivalent 
quantit ies of labour, assuming that each works 
every day from dawn to dusk. 
This imaginary economy, where everyone 
offers what he has personally produced, is gov-
erned by the exchange of equivalents as re-
gards the labour content of each commodity 
—the law of value— in the sphere of circula-
tion, and by the principle of'to each according 
to his work' in the sphere of distribution.12 
In terms of personal purchasing power, 
this means that the total amount of labour em-
bodied in other commodities which each party 
can acquire is equal to the total amount of la-
bour he has invested in the commodities which 
he is offering. If this is the case, both the ratio of 
exchange between the goods —the terms of 
trade— and the changes which occur in them 
depend on the technical conditions of produc-
tion and any changes which may occur in them. 
It should be noted in particular that, if one 
of the parties can offer a greater quantity of 
goods per unit of labour time, this is because 
his productivity has risen. This in turn leads to 
a rise in the relative abundance of that good in 
relation to the others which are offered, and, as 
a consequence, its exchange value declines. In 
this way technical progress does not prevent 
the terms of trade from reflecting simulta-
neously changes in the relative scarcity and 
labour content of each good. 
To put it briefly, technical progress is com-
patible with the application of the law of value 
and at the same time with the points of equilib-
rium of supply and demand. In these condi-
tions the open appropriation of the benefits of 
productivity prevails, except in the special 
case where the rise in productivity is not re-
flected in an increase in supply, but in an in-
crease in leisure on the part of the most produc-
tive supplier. 
If we eliminate the alternative of greater 
leisure, the rise in productivity by each produc-
er participating in the exchange will be reflect-
ed in greater relative abundance of the good 
and, accordingly, in an increase in the general 
12However, on the above assumptions, if there were 
more than two participants, there would still be no neces-
sary reason for the law of value to be fulfilled, since individ-
ual preferences, for example, might generate exchange re-
lations which were not in keeping with the law. 
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purchasing power of the remaining partici-
pants in the barter system.13 
2. Determination of value in market conditions 
However, a market relationship is very differ-
ent. Those who possess useful objects have no 
'face-to-face' relationship with one another as 
in barter, and do not identify one another by the 
commodity they produce, and thus offer. On 
the contrary, at any moment in the process, 
those who possess commodities are seeking 
those who possess money, without asking 
where, how or when they obtained it. 
We might assume that access to money can 
only be secured by means of a sale, so that any 
purchaser would previously have to have been 
a seller. This would be a case of simple circula-
tion of commodities,14 where money is an ex-
pression of the exchange value of the commod-
ities and serves only to eliminate the practical 
inconveniences of bartering. 
However, a rapid and superficial glance at 
history would show us that there are many ways 
of gaining control of money and the sources of 
money, and in general terms the possession of 
money in large quantities is not initially deriv-
ed from the prior production and sale of com-
modities but from a varied and changing set of 
power positions which stem from the concrete 
dynamics of the social structure. 
Thus, the facts show the opposite: some 
participants come to the market in possession 
of money obtained from sources other than the 
sale of an object they have personally produc-
ed. This situation becomes clearer as the com-
modities used as money become more "special-
ized' and cease to possess 'intrinsic value', ei-
ther because they cannot be used for any other 
purpose, or because their exchange value does 
not depend on the amount of labour required to 
produce them. This is particularly true when 
money takes the form of a piece of paper whose 
acceptance is made obligatory by virtue of a 
simple determination on the part of the State. 
13Here it is assumed that any absolute rise in the sup-
ply of a given good is totally absorbed by the other parties, 
but with modifications in the exchange value of the good. 
14This, as is well known, corresponds to one of the 
modes of production analysed by Marx as pure types. 
In our original idyllic and imaginary barter 
situation —or even in a similar situation where 
money was one more commodity functioning 
as a unit of account— the purchasing power of 
each party was linked to the work he perform-
ed. 
However, all civilized societies have de-
vised power mechanisms under which some of 
their members —to date a minority— have 
been able to share in the social product without 
having to justify their share as remuneration for 
their personal labour. Offerings to priests, taxes 
paid to the State and remuneration paid to own-
ers of property are among the ways of receiving 
surplus labour in the form of products which 
will not be directly used by those who worked 
directly to generate them. This applies as fully 
and inevitably to Egyptian society of 5.000 
years ago as to modern capitalist or socialist 
societies. 
In these surplus-producing societies, the 
purchasing power of each producer is clearly 
distinguished from his productive power (or 
productivity) per unit of labour time, since part 
of his product will be consumed by élites en-
gaged exclusively in political, martial, scientif-
ic, artistic, religious or other tasks. 
In modern capitalist and socialist societies 
personal income takes the form of money for 
the most part, and knowledge of its distribution 
is a decisive factor in ascertaining the composi-
tion of demand. Goods are not exchanged for 
goods, but for money: as a result, any change in 
the magnitude or distribution of monetary in-
come will in the short term affect the level and 
structure of relative prices. And this occurs in-
dependently of what happens in the technical 
sphere of production. 
Money is the objectification and the mea-
sure of purchasing power —purchasing power 
which is predicated with respect to commodi-
ties. Part of those commodities constitute the 
social product, which is the flow offinal goods 
and services periodically emerging from the 
process of production. Conversely, the coun-
terpart of this physical flow is a flow of mone-
tary units (essentially wages and payments for 
use of property) that productive enterprises pay 
as incomes to those who make the process of 
production technically possible. 
As we shall see below in greater detail, 
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these money payments made by enterprises 
constitute circulating capital when they are 
transferred to the workers, recipients of pay-
ment for the use of their property, and others 
who make possible the process of production. 
Meanwhile , the same money flows which, from 
the viewpoint of the enterprises, constitute 
capital are regarded as incomes by their recipi-
ents.15 
At this point it is necessary to ask: what is 
the general purchasing power which is ascrib-
ed to each unit of monetary income, and on 
what does it depend? 
In an initial, superficial analysis, the gen-
eral purchasing power of each unit of monetary 
income depends on the relative magnitude of 
two flows: a flow of concrete units of final con-
sumption goods and services, and a flow of 
units of monetary income. 
If, in order to eliminate from our field of 
analysis the question of insufficient effective 
demand, we assume that the entire global in-
come is spent within the periods in which it is 
received, it is possible to calculate for each 
period a general level of prices which repre-
sents the average quantity of units of monetary 
income which are transferred in exchange for 
each concrete unit ofsocial product. It is there-
fore clear that the general purchasing power of 
each unit of monetary income is inversely pro-
portional to the average general level of prices 
corresponding to the period. 
Still in macro-economic terms, it is possi-
ble to imagine three situations which make pos-
sible stability in the level of prices, and conse-
quently in the purchasing power of each unit of 
monetary income. Firstly, where the total mag-
ni tude of physical and monetary flows remains 
constant per unit of time; secondly and thirdly, 
where the rate of growth (or decline) in the two 
flows is synchronized a ta single rate. 
Changes in the general purchasing power 
of each unit of monetary income allow a larger 
number of possibilities. This general purchas-
ing power may grow: (i) because the total num-
ber of units of product flowing per unit of time 
, 5We shall not consider here flows of circulating capi-
tal be tween enterprises; the argument will be based only 
on that part of the capital which leaves the sphere of the 
enterprises in the form of income. 
remains constant, while the number of units 
which compose monetary income tends to fall; 
(ii) because both decline, but the flow of mone-
tary income declines more rapidly; (iii) be-
cause both grow, but the flow of monetary in-
come grows more slowly. 
On the other hand, the purchasing power 
of each unit of monetary income may fall: (i) 
because the total number of units of product 
flowing per unit of time remains constant, 
while the number of monetary units which 
have been paid in the form of income tends to 
grow; (ii) because both flows decline, but the 
flow of monetary income declines more slowly; 
(iii) because both rise, but the flow of monetary 
income rises more rapidly. However, only 
some of these theoretical possibilities are his-
torically significant. 
We may use the term unit of real income 
for the general purchasing power ascribed to 
the possession of each unit of monetary in-
come. It is equal to the monetary unit of income 
divided by the average level of prices corres-
ponding to the period under consideration. 
What is actually being measured by each 
unit of 'real ' income thus defined? It does not 
measure magnitudes of utility, satisfaction or 
welfare, because there is no objective unit of 
measurement, and also because the concrete 
components of the social product also include 
arms which will be acquired by murderers, 
drugs and narcoticts, products which will cause 
irreparable damage to the environment, and so 
on. Nor does it measure magnitudes of social 
labour —living or past— because the total 
quantity the product generated depends not 
only on the amount of labour contributed but 
on the average levels of labour productivity, 
which are constantly changing. Consequently, 
changes in the total quantity of the product 
have no constant or necessary relationship with 
changes in the total quantity of labour. 
Each unit of 'real' income merely measu-
res rriagnitudes of general purchasing power, 
and is inversely proportional to the average ge-
neral level of prices. In fact, when we say that 
' real ' income expresses the purchasing power 
of monetary income, we are using an incorrect 
expression. Purchasing power can only be pos-
tulated with respect to human beings, who pos-
sess reason, awareness and will. It is a social 
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form of power, or, more precisely, a translation 
to the economic sphere of many and varied 
forms of power which stem from the social 
structure. As a result, purchasing power be-
longs not to the monetary income, but to the 
owner of that income. A similar observation 
might be made, if a digression will be permit-
ted, regarding the expression "payments for 
services rendered by the factors of produc-
tion", which in fact are not paid to the 'servi-
ces ' , but to the owners of the factors. Neverthe-
less, in the interests of brevity we may accept 
incorrect but succint expressions such as "the 
purchasing power of income". 
Let us now delve à little more deeply into 
the factors which may affect the economic va-
lue —that is, the general purchasing power— 
'of monetary income; and let it be clear that 
what w e are calling real income is the economic 
value of monetary income. 
First and foremost it is necessary to inquire 
into the 'social justification' of the monetary 
incomes which are distributed as a counterpart 
of the flow of final products which emerge, 
after some delay, from the process of produc-
tion. In this regard, the conventional wisdom in 
economic science holds that these monetary 
incomes are compensation for the contribution 
to production made by each owner of the fac-
tors of production used. 
Discussion of 'merits' is associated with 
the problem of attribution, because it involves 
the question of whether it is possible to identify 
which proportion of the product, within each 
unit of production, corresponds to each owner 
of factors of production and legitimates the re-
munerat ion he seeks. Since we shall return to 
this point in the final section of the article, it 
will suffice for the present to say that these 
'merits ' cannot be logically 'deduced' from ab-
stract, universally valid principles, nor can they 
be inferred from observation of the concrete 
processes of production which derive from 
each economic activity. 
Here we shall assert that the relationship 
between participation in the process of pro-
duction and the income received by virtue of 
that participation is a relationship of power. All 
those who share in the 'power to produce' or 
'productive power' of enterprises must be re-
munerated so that they do not use their power 
to hinder or obstruct the process. Wages, conse-
quently, should be regarded as a payment to 
the worker to ensure that he does not hinder the 
process of production by refusing to work, and 
the same may be said of the rent for use of land 
paid to its owner. They are of importance in the 
process of production and, since the factors are 
their private property, they can exert their 
power by omission —by refusing to make them 
available. The extent to which they can exert 
this power is a very different matter. The very 
size of the remuneration they receive is an eco-
nomic measure of the bargaining power which 
arises from their respective positions in the so-
cial structure. This power is in part exerted 'by 
omission', through the creation of a relative 
scarcity of essential productive resources, but 
many other factors of a socio-cultural and politi-
cal nature are also involved. 
Taxes paid to the State, for example, consti-
tute recognition of the 'active' power that the 
State can exert by, for example, ordering the 
closure of an enterprise which does not fulfil its 
tax obligations. 
This social struggle out of which the distri-
bution of money income arises is both prior and 
externai to the process of production proper, 
simply because before producing it is neces-
sary to be able to produce. To put it in a briefer 
and almost self-evident manner, production 
presupposes productive power, which is 
moulded by co-operation in the technical 
sphere between members of society who have 
opposed interests in the economic sphere. 
Obviously, the distribution of monetary in-
come becomes the distribution of real income 
only when the recipients of incomes come to 
the market and convert that income into de-
mand, which becomes effective in respect of 
the final product which flows from the sphere 
of production. It is here that the purchasing 
power latent in each monetary unit becomes 
explicit and is realized. 
However, the sphere of production is a 
'mosaic' of heterogeneous technical processes 
which operate between branches of produc-
tion, and even within each branch. This means 
that even workers with the same qualifications 
carrying out the same activity can record diffe-
rent levels of technical productivity. Within 
each branch, the enterprises with more advan-
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ced techniques will produce more units per 
man-hour, and will consequently be able to pay 
higher wages and other benefits which, within 
certain limits, will be compatible with rates of 
profit at or above the average for the branch. 
However, only enterprises with sufficient capi-
tal —purchasing power applied to produc-
tion— will be able to obtain access to these 
more advanced techniques and so raise the 
physical productivity of human labour. 
If this process is viewed as a whole, and 
from a dynamic viewpoint, it is the power posi-
tions and relations stemming from the social 
structure which in the final analysis determine 
the distribution of both the purchasing power 
and the productive power generated in each 
economic system, and the way in which they 
may change as a result of growth.16 
Finally, we may note the sterility of the 
conventional wisdom concerning the theory of 
value and distribution in conditions of general 
equil ibrium as far as explaining the phenome-
non of inflation is concerned. 
It is precisely through its efforts to grasp 
this issue intellectually that Latin American 
structuralism has established a link between 
the themes of power, in its many social forms, 
and its concrete manifestations in the sphere of 
general purchasing power.17 
Inflation is a persistent imbalance which 
takes the form of a sustained decline in the 
general purchasing power associated with the 
possession of each unit of monetary income. 
Growth in the supply of money is the ele-
ment on which 'monetarist' attention is fo-
" 'The study of these differentiated technical and •so-
cial positions and their influence on the distribution of 
general purchasing power in the societies of the periphery 
is usually approached in terms of the concept oí structural 
heterogeneity. See, for example, Aníbal Pinto, "Heteroge-
neidad estructural y modelo de desarrollo reciente en Amé-
rica Latina", in his collection of essays Inflación, Raíces 
Estructurales (Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1973). For a dynamic appreciation of the subject of struc-
tural heterogeneity, see Raúl Prebisch, "Socioeconomic 
structure and crisis of peripheral capitalism", CEPAL Re-
view, No. 6 (second half of 1978), particularly section III. 
See also Osvaldo Sunkel, "La dependencia y la heteroge-
neidad estructural", El Trimestre Económico (México 
City), \ o . 177 (January-March 1978). 
1 ' See, for example, Raúl Prebisch, Hacia una Dinámi-
ca del Desarrollo Latinoamericano (Mexico City, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1963), section B-II, "El funcionamíen-
cussed, and if we ignore the dynamics of the 
social structure and power relationships at the 
international level, we will have an explana-
tion which is superficial but may be accompa-
nied by concrete practical recommendations 
on ways and means of slowing down growth in 
the average general level of prices. These re-
commendations, which have connexions with 
the orthodoxy of virtuous fiscal and credit poli-
cies, have a social cost which usually takes the 
form of recession, unemployment and concen-
tration of income distribution if they are not 
accompanied by 'real' measures which affect 
the power positions and relations arising from 
the social structure. Even if we ignore the 
structural imbalances which derive from each 
country's position in the world economic order, 
there still remain on the domestic level many 
factors of social conflict which constitute the 
expression of the power of the different social 
classes and groups to appropriate a share of the 
flow of the social product. 
The study of inflation enables us to ob-
serve on a larger and in some cases 'blown-up' 
scale the social conflict which underlies fluc-
tuations in the distribution of monetary income 
and in the structure of relative prices. How-
ever, this social conflict, which is constantly in 
existence, is particularly prominent when the 
total magnitudes of the real product sought by 
the different classes, subclasses and sectors 
which comprise the social structure are greater 
than those actually being generated by the sys-
tem. The basic structural foundations of this 
struggle are connected with the network of so-
cial and technical positions and relations which 
to del sistema y la estructura social". See also the appendix, 
"El falso dilema entre desarrollo económico estabilidad 
monetaria". See in addition Aníbal Pinto, "Raíces estructu-
rales de la inflación en América Latina", in Inflación, Raí-
ces Estructurales, op. cit.- Osvaldo Sunkel, "La inflación 
chilena: un enfoque heterodoxo", El Trimestre Económi-
co, No. 100 (October-December 1958); and Osvaldo Sun-
kel, "El fracaso de las políticas de estabilización en el 
contexto del desarrollo latinoamericano", El Trimestre 
Económico, No. 120 (October-December 1963). For a 
more strictly sociological approach to the question, see 
Jorge Graciarena, "Estructura de poder y distribución del 
ingreso en America Latina", in Alejandro Foxley, éd., Dis-
tribución del Ingreso (Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Eco-
nómica, 1974), and Rolando Franco, "Apuntes para un aná-
lisis sociológico d e la inflación", Revista Paraguaya de 
Sociología, No. 36 (May-August 1976). 
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form around the processes of production, distri-
bution and circulation of the means of produc-
tion and the social product.18 From these basic 
structural foundations arises a specific manner 
of distributing money income which interacts 
with the rate and distribution of technical pro-
gress within the structure of production. This 
process is by no means 'spontaneous', and is to 
a very large extent determined by the actions 
—or omissions— which derive from the go-
vernment's concrete economic policy. This 
process especially complex in Latin American 
societies, both because of their position in the 
world economic order and because of the inter-
nal heterogeneity of their social structure, 
which is inherent in the peripheral forms of 
capitalist development. Since it is not our aim 
here to diagnose concrete situations, we will 
endeavour to adapt these arguments to the ana-
lysis of some essential categories required in 
order to explain the process of capitalist de-
velopment. 
Il l 
Value and capital 
1. Money and economic value 
The earliest contributions to economic thought 
speak of value as 'something' which is 'contai-
ned' in the object of exchange. As long ago as 
the time of Aristode19 a distinction was made 
between the utility of an object and its suitabi-
lity for exchange. The classical economists and 
Marx distinguished between use value and ex-
change value. Use value was the capacity of the 
object to meet the needs or fulfil the purposes 
of its users. Exchange value was the quantity of 
other goods which could be exchanged for a 
unit of the good whose value it was wished to 
l f )The structural heterogeneity of Latin American so-
ciet ies might b e broadly defined as the coexistence of so-
cial and technical positions and relations which, in politica-
lly unified national societies, correspond to different pha-
ses and forms of regional development. This heterogeneity 
may be analysed in the light of its three main dimensions. 
The first relates to the structures of production, in which 
many technical processes coexist and interact. The second 
concerns the social relations which are formed on the basis 
of the processes of production. The third appears basically 
in the political sphere, and concerns the institutional order 
which endorses and guarantees the structure and functio-
ning of the power system. See Aníbal Pinto and Armando 
Di Fil ippo, "Desarrollo y pobreza en la América Latina: un 
enfoque histórico-estructural", El Trimestre Económico, 
No. 183 {July-September 1979). 
l9"Twofold is the use of every object,.. The one is 
peculiar to the object as such, the other is not, as a sandal 
which may be worn, and is also exchangeable." Aristotle, 
De Republica, I, i, chapter 9. 
calculate. The paradox of value, which preoc-
cupied many thinkers, emphasized the fact that 
objects with little use value —such as dia-
monds or other precious stones— might come 
to have a very high exchange value, while very 
useful objects, such as water, had an infinitesi-
mal exchange value per unit. 
This led the classical economists, and also 
Marx, to make a categorical distinction be-
tween use value and exchange value, and focus 
attention on the latter. This gave rise to the 
theories of economic value based on labour, 
which held that the number of units of one good 
which could be exchanged for another depen-
ded on the labour content of each. We will not 
linger here on the nuances and complexities of 
this school, because they are not relevant to the 
argument to be presented; we need only note 
that for this school exchange value depends on 
'something' incorporated in the object being 
valued, namely its labour content. 
In the last third of the nineteenth century 
the neo-classical liberal economists turned 
again to the use value or utility of 'goods', fin-
ding an apparent solution to the paradox of va-
lue. They noted that the satisfaction furnished 
in each case by a 'good' depends not only on the 
qualities that confer utility on it, but on its rela-
tive abundance or scarcity. Hence as water is 
very useful, but also very abundant, its ex-
change value is low, while the opposite applies 
to diamonds. The very idea of an 'economic 
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good' sums up both features: utility and scar-
city. Consequently, under this approach what 
is important is not the 'general' or 'average' 
utility of a good, but the utility which each 
additional or marginal unit of the good fur-
nishes to each consumer individually. The in-
verse relation between utility and abundance 
is expressed in the law of diminishing marginal 
utility. 
It can thus be seen that for both schools the 
exchange value of a commodity results not from 
the social relations of exchange, but from 
'something' which is specific to the object. In 
the labour theories of value, the starting point 
for the exchange value of an object is repre-
sented by the amount of productive labour in-
vested in it by its 'direct producers'. In the 
marginal utility theories it is represented by 
the marginal utility found in it by its 'direct 
consumers ' . 
T h e social relation of exchange arises sub-
sequently, and normally appears first in the 
form of barter. In Marx's case, his whole theory 
of value starts from a situation of barter, and 
not of trade, with the barter operation split into 
two stages, purchase and sale. The neo-
classical economists also begin their argument 
with an analysis of a hypothetical barter situa-
tion, or at most with money introduced as a 
'neutral ' unit of account. 
But there is not need for us to become im-
mersed in conceptual complexities. It will suf-
fice to say that for all these theories, when the 
social relation of barter appears in the analysis, 
the fundamental fact of attributing value has 
already occurred, either because the commodi-
ties already contain the labour which confers 
value on them, or because the potential consu-
mer has already —in a prior act of introspec-
tion— determined the relative utility of the 
goods he will consume. 
In short, both theories come to the social 
relations of exchange not only belatedly, but 
also mistakenly. Belatedly, because they view 
the fundamental act of attributing value —in-
corporating labour or assigning utility— as ex-
ternal to that relation. Mistakenly, because 
they do not recognize the specificity of money, 
but treat it as one more commodity (Marx) or as 
a simple unit of account. In this way they lose 
sight of the central significance of money as the 
objectification and measure of general purcha-
sing power, whose genesis and distribution 
must stand at the heart of any theory of econo-
mic value. 
2. General purchasing power and the use 
of money 
The broadest category we shall use here to exa-
mine the operation of a capitalist economic sys-
tem is the concept of general purchasing 
power, which is associated with the possession 
of money. In capitalist societies, market rela-
tions of exchange attain general applicability 
by converting into commodities not only the 
products of human labour but also the means 
and conditions —human and non-human— of 
production. It is in this context that the purcha-
sing power conferred by money acquires grea-
test significance. 
Money is not a commodity in itself, but it is 
the general incentive which converts into com-
modities the objects of exchange which are bar-
tered for it, thus conferring general purchasing 
power on its possessors. The social division of 
labour requires money, and money requires 
the social division of labour. 
We call money the general medium of ex-
change, which has the quality of conferring on 
those who possess it similarly general purcha-
sing power, which money itself is responsible 
for measuring; and we call commodities the 
remaining objects of exchange which are bar-
tered for money. Money is not necessarily a 
commodity, though it may be one. Commodi-
ties are objects of exchange which are desired 
for their own sake, because of intrinsic proper-
ties which characterize them, whereas market 
practice may reduce money to a mere token 
lacking any use other than serving as such. Mar-
ket relations are social relations which presup-
pose specific social institutions (such as owner-
ship, contracts, and so on), legal regulations and 
obligatory standards of behaviour. The system 
of buying and selling presupposes relations of 
exchange based on the market which provide a 
framework for the exercise of general purcha-
sing power. 
Here we will refer to the specifically eco-
nomic aspects of the subject of money —in par-
ticular, to economic value, which for us is inse-
parable from the use of money. 
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Both the labour theories of value and the 
subjective marginal utility theories assert that 
the economic value attributable to a com-
modity depends on factors external to the mar-
ket relation proper, and they therefore ignore 
the significance of money. By leaving aside the 
independen t influence which derives from the 
distribution of money, they also leave aside 
general purchasing power, which is measured 
and exerted through it, and as a result lose sight 
of the essential feature of all market relations. 
All market relations are basically relations of 
power. All these relations are closely interde-
penden t as a result of the social division of 
labour. Since each market operation involves a 
clash of power, the result of this clash must be 
expressed in units of power. 
As we have seen, the specifically economic 
form of power is general purchasing power. 
Economic value therefore expresses magnitu-
des of general purchasing power. This central 
idea has been developed more systematically 
in section II of this article, and there is no need 
to linger on this point here. 
3. Capital and the dynamics of attributing 
value 
Marx discussed the idea of capital with great 
percipience, but then obscured its meaning 
when adopting his labour theory of value. Capi-
tal, as w e understand it here, is assimilated to 
the concept of money-capital in Marx as regards 
its cycles of circulation, but differs radically in 
terms of economic value. For Marx the econo-
mic value of capital lies in the social labour 
content it mobilizes and appropriates; in other 
words, money is converted into capital when it 
acquires potential labour and realizes its poten-
tial, i.e., when it extracts labour from its 
sources, namely workers. For Marx money ap-
propriates not only potential labour, but also 
past labour crystallized in the form of various 
means of production which must be combined 
in a productive manner with that potential 
labour. 
Marx was certainly in no doubt that the 
ownership of capital gives the capitalist power 
over the workers he engages. The whole body 
of Marxian sociology highlights the relations of 
domination involved when the owner of capital 
imposes his power on the owner of labour 
power. 
However, Marx only partially reflected 
this relationship of power in his basic economic 
categories; his 'law' of value in fact assumes 
that all commodities are exchanged for their 
value.20 
Equivalence is assumed in the exchange of 
commodities with respect to a common magni-
tude, i.e., the amount of unskilled average (so-
cial) labour they contain. Marx's theory of value 
takes as a starting point a barter situation in 
which all the commodities being bartered con-
tain the same amount of social labour. 
The power of each participant is measured 
in terms of the amount of labour contained in 
the commodity offered, and corresponds to the 
amount of labour —in the form of another 
good— which he can acquire. The theoretical 
significance of this proposition lies in the fact 
that it can serve as a hypothesis in forecasting in 
what proportions goods will be exchanged in 
practice. If this 'law' of value is applied, any 
technical progress which diminishes the la-
bour content of a commodity will reduce its 
exchange value in relation to other goods. This 
condition is necessary in order to maintain 
equality or equilibrium between the labour 
contents of the different goods. Under this hy-
pothesis —which is certainly not borne out in 
practice— the bargaining power of each party 
in the market is tied to the labour content of his 
commodity. If he invests one hour of social 
labour in his commodity, he will be able to 
receive only an hour of social labour in the 
commodities he purchases. If the 'law' of value 
is accepted, bargaining power or purchasing 
power loses all importance in determining in 
what proportions the commodities themselves 
will be exchanged, since this power is comple-
tely subordinate to a technological condition 
which is external to the market relation itself, 
namely the labour content of each commod-
ity.21 
2(>Karl Marx, Capital. 
2 , W e have already analysed the theory of 'modified' 
value in the light of the concept of'production price' and 
the transfers of purchasing power hetween enterprises 
which it involves. We have also considered the efforts oi 
the Marxist school to reconcile the concept of production 
prices with the 'law' of value. 
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The most significant aspect of this conclu-
sion is that the influence of power relations on 
the appropriation and generation of the surplus 
is eliminated from the sphere of relations of 
exchange based on the market, and thus comes 
to fall exclusively within the sphere of 
production. 
Of course, from the very outset the rela-
tions between capitalist and worker manifest 
an asymmetry of power which finds expression 
in the fact that the value contained in the mo-
ney which the capitalist brings to the market is 
—or can be— incomparably greater than the 
value of the labour power of each worker.22 
Marx recognizes this asymmetry of purchasing 
power between the capitalist and the worker, 
which the market is responsible for reflecting 
and reproducing. What the law of value does is 
to eliminate from the field of analysis every 
other asymmetry of power than that of this ba-
sic relationship between capital and labour 
which is capable of affecting the process of 
appropriation of the surplus. 
However, in order to expound the law of 
value in a comprehensive manner, Marx also 
considers money, in its most genuine expres-
sion, as a commodity —gold or silver— whose 
value is determined like that of any other com-
modity, on the basis of the amount of labour 
socially necessary to produce it in average tech-
nical conditions. 
The shift from money as a commodity to 
the now widespread forms of money as a token 
—which can express economic values that are 
much higher than the actual physical content of 
the monetary units— involves a radical seve-
rance of links between the quantities of money 
which can be placed on the market and the 
quantities of labour required for the production 
of gold and silver. 
2 2 I t is another matter to determine for what reason the 
capitalist is able to appear in the market already in posses-
sion of money-capital, which contains substantial quanti-
ties of value, while the worker comes to the market in a 
position to offer only the meagre value contained in his 
labour power. The explanation must be sought not in 
theory, bu t in history. Marx banishes this problem to the 
historical process of primary accumulation, where the 
struggles for power in the formative phase of the capitalist 
social order occur in all their rawness. 
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Not all the capitalists who appear in the 
market have obtained their money at the far-off 
starting point of primary accumulation; some of 
them have obtained it through much more con-
crete and real power positions and relations 
connected with a social structure in which mo-
ney plays a role as a token and not as a 
commodity. 
Nevertheless Marx's basic explanations 
concerning value and surplus value take as a 
point of departure money as a commodity and 
not as a token. 
If the capitalist pays the labourer in copper 
coin, the coins must be the equivalent, in terms 
of labour time, of that contained in the com-
modity acquired. In other words, the wage 
must be equivalent to the labour time which is 
socially necessary to produce the labour power 
of the worker. For Marx, therefore, surplus va-
lue arises in the production sphere as the diffe-
rence between the living labour appropriated 
by the capitalist and the labour contained in 
the means of subsistence consumed by the la-
bourer. Since in the sphere of circulation the 
exchange of equivalents prevails, the general 
purchasing power which originates in market 
relations themselves has no meaning in Marx's 
theory. 
For this reason, Marx sees money as no 
more than a 'form' into which capital is conver-
ted in its cycle of circulation; he holds that 
capital has a value which derives not from its 
specific form but from the labour which lies 
behind that form. 
From our viewpoint money-capital is a 
magnitude of general purchasing power—and 
is consequently an economic value— which 
can only be exerted (as regards the power) and 
measured (as regards the magnitude) in terms 
of money. The purchasing power conferred by 
this money does not depend on the labour con-
tent of each monetary unit, but on technical and 
social conditions which mould the power struc-
ture in each society. 
Capital is a magnitude of general purcha-
sing power which acquires means of produc-
tion and stimulates the productive power of the 
economic system with the aim of ensuring that 
the capital reproduces itself within a process of 
growth. This is the specifically capitalist form 
of capital. 
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4. Capital and capital goods 
Viewed in this way, capital should be distin-
guished as a concept from capital goods. Capi-
tal is a magnitude of purchasing power used to 
acquire or hire the means of production (both 
human and non-human), which become capital 
goods. They are 'converted' into capital goods 
when the capitalist uses his purchasing power 
to appropriate them. 
Under Marx's labour theory of value, the 
technical significance of producers' goods and 
their economic value become fused into a sin-
gle whole when expressed in the form of social 
labour time. 
When capital is distinguished from capital 
goods, a clear distinction is made between the 
sphere of circulation and the sphere of 
production.23 
5. Capital and time 
Moreover, this distinction demands a dynamic 
analysis, which is explicit in the process of ca-
pital circulation postulated by Marx, but which 
Marx forgot when elaborating further on the 
theory of value and surplus value at the macro-
economic level. 
When the phases of capital circulation 
which Marx himself highlighted (m-c-m') are 
distinguished, it is obvious that between them 
there exists an irreversible order and time se-
quence . Capitalists taken together as a social 
class pay wages to workers and rents to the 
owners of land, thus generating incomes which 
return in the form of demand to acquire the 
commodities that the capitalists themselves 
will offer.24 If w e disregard delays, the very in-
comes paid by the capitalists will return in the 
form of demand for the product generated in 
response to the payment of that remuneration. 
But these incomes are equivalent to the value 
2 : iThe means of production are not capital goods in 
themselves. They are converted into capital goods when 
they are acquired by the capitalist. From this viewpoint, 
the process of capital accumulation does not necessarily 
involve the capitalist production of new capital goods; it 
may also involve the appropriation by capital of other, pre-
existing producers ' goods. 
2 4No account is taken here of sales of intermediate 
inputs from one enterprise to another. 
of the product at factor cost, and do not include 
profit. Consequently, if only the same quantity 
of money which the capitalist enterprises have 
placed in circulation returns to them, from 
where do they obtain the profit, understood as a 
surplus over and above total costs? Profit thus 
remains unexplained because of the static na-
ture of the approach.25 
For the neo-classicists, as we have seen, 
the problem of profits does not affect the logical 
validity of their model of general equilibrium, 
which assumes static conditions of perfect com-
petition. The concept of factors of production is 
used, and it is assumed that each factor receives 
payment equivalent to the marginal value of its 
contribution to the product. Entrepreneurs re-
gulate their demand for capital (understood as 
purchasing power) in the light of the marginal 
productivity of capital (understood as a factor of 
production) in new investment. The suppliers 
of purchasing power which will be used as ca-
pital —i.e., savers— charge interest, which is 
compensation for the postponement of their 
consumption. Consequently the remuneration 
of capital as a factor of production exactly off-
sets the value of its marginal contribution to the 
total product, and includes no surplus. Mean-
while, payment for capital as a magnitude of 
purchasing power is expressed through the in-
terest rate, and is compensation for the 'disuti-
lity' arising from the postponement of 
consumption. 
In this way, the neo-classical economists 
ignore profit viewed as a net surplus over 
costs. Capital in the strict sense results from 
saving, and savers are compensated for the 'dis-
utility' they suffer. Capital as a factor of pro-
duction assumes an independent and active 
role in generating value, and merits compensa-
tion, which of course is received not by the 
'factor' but by its owner. 
This explanation of the marginal utility ap-
proach must be modified to take account of the 
contributions of a few neo-classical economists 
who have recognized the influence of time in 
2 SWhen analysing the process of capital circulation, 
Marx adopts a dynamic approach in volume II of his princi-
pal work; however, his approach is static when he en-
deavours to explain the realization of surplus value at the 
macro-economic level. See section V below. 
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the logic of capital, and even its function as a 
repository of economic power.2fi 
Bohm-Bawerk, following a path previously 
opened up by Jevons, establishes a significant 
association between time and capital. He defi-
nes capital (here in the form of a capital good) as 
an extension of the process of production which 
raises the productivity of human labour. How-
ever, after this auspicious start, Bõhm-Bawerk 
returns to the fold of neo-classical theory. The 
supply of capital (understood as a value) from 
individuals who save has a price, charged by 
those savers. How is the magnitude of the sa-
vings which will be offered on the capital mar-
The most appropriate theoretical framework 
for understanding the concept of capital used 
here, and the concept of the surplus formulated 
by Prebisch, which is dealt with in subsequent 
sections, is that derived from the work of Jo-
seph A. Schumpeter. 
Schumpeter held that economic develop-
ment involves conditions of general disequili-
br ium which can only be introduced in the 
economic process thanks to the use entrepre-
neurs make of credit in order to incorporate 
innovations which raise the productivity of hu-
man labour. 
In conditions of general equilibrium and 
full employment, or conditions of 'circular 
flow', as he termed it, macro-economic proiit 
will be nil and interests, which in Schumpe-
ter 's view can exist only as a fraction of that 
profit, will also be nil. Profit as he conceives it 
is, strictly speaking, a surplus derived from 
economic development. 
26An analysis of the significance of time in economic 
theory and the conception of capital adopted hy the econo-
mists of the Austrian school appears in G.L.S. Shackle, 
Epistemics and Economics: A Critique of Economic Doc-
trines (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
ket determined? In answer to this question he 
presents his theory that future goods are valued 
less highly than present goods. In this way, the 
supply of capital capable of financing invest-
ment has a price which, in the final analysis, 
depends on the psychological attitude of 
savers. 
Strictly speaking, what should interest us 
in Bohm-Bawerk27 is not the length of the pe-
riod of production —which is a false problem— 
nor the psychological attitude of individual sa-
vers, but the distribution of purchasing power 
which makes their saving possible and is added 
to the profit which remains in the enterprises. 
The innovating entrepreneur raises labour 
productivity in his technical processes and 
lowers unit costs; this brings him an extraor-
dinary profit over his competitors.28 This profit, 
clearly understood as a surplus over entrepre-
neurial costs, will remain until the innovation 
has spread to all competitors in the economic 
branch concerned. Then the innovation as such 
disappears, and becomes a generally used tech-
nical process. 
The changes are introduced by the innova-
ting entrepreneur, on the basis of access to cap-
ital which derives from credit and involves the 
creation of money which has as a counterpart 
not a real product, but a potential product. If, 
like Schumpeter, we take as a starting point 
'circular flow' in conditions of full employ-
ment, this credit makes it possible to transfer 
material and human resources from their old 
2 7What merits consideration is not the length of the 
period of production but the increase in labour productivity 
per unit of time. This increase can be observed over time: 
however, it does not depend merely on the passing of time, 
but on the introduction of technical progress. 
2f iThis concept is similar to Marx's concept of extra-
ordinary surplus value. 
IV 
Development, capital, cycles and the surplus in 
Schumpeter's economic approach 
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uses to the new ones involved in the innova-
tion; this gives rise to additional and unexpect-
ed demand in the markets for factors of produc-
tion, which succeeds in changing the direction 
laid down in the previous course of production. 
The capital appropriated and used by the in-
novating entrepreneur constitutes purchasing 
power which he exerts on the factor markets, 
and which, through the credit mechanism, is 
(involuntarily) transferred to him by the other 
entrepreneurs who have not been as successful 
in the financial market. 
This necessarily initiates a cyclical process 
based on inflationary pressures on the cost 
side, until the emergence of the final product, 
which is the result of the innovation and gene-
rates the profit which is used to pay the interest 
that constitutes the price of the credit granted. 
In short, in conditions of 'circular flow' 
with fun utilization of the factors of production, 
profit could not exist as a net macro-economic 
magnitude. But the innovating entrepreneur 
'breaks ' the circular flow, acquires command 
over the purchasing power of the capital, impo-
ses an innovation which lowers unit costs, se-
cures extraordinary profits and pays the inter-
est.29 
For Schumpeter economic cycles repre-
sent the adaptation of the economic system to 
the unfolding process which stems from entre-
preneurial innovations. 
Sehumpeter 's contributions are of excep-
2 ! )" If entrepreneurs were in a position to commandeer 
the producers ' goods which they need to carry their new 
plans into effect, there would still be entrepreneurs' profit, 
but no part of it would have to be paid out by them as 
interest. Nor would there be any motive for them to con-
sider part of it as interest on the 'capital' they expend 
[emphasis in original]. On the contrary, the whole of what 
they make over and above costs would be 'profits' to them 
and nothing else. It is only because other people have 
command of the necessary producers' goods that entrepre-
neurs must call in the capitalist to help them to remove the 
obstacle which private property in means of production or 
the right to dispose freely of one's personal services puts in 
their way. No such help is wanted in producing within the 
circular flow, for firms already running can be, and in prin-
ciple are, currently financed by previous receipts, which 
stream to them without the intervention of any distinct 
capitalistic agency." Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of 
Economic Development, trans. Redvers Opie (Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 177. 
tional originality, especially as regards his con-
ception of capital. In The Theory of Economic 
Development he speaks of purchasing power 
made available to innovating entrepreneurs, 
bu t later, in Business Cycles, when he observes 
that capital —in one of its acceptations, the 
monetary one— is not a factor of production but 
a differentiable agent which stands between 
the entrepreneur and the factors of produc-
tion,3" he appears to broaden his definition to 
include the general purchasing power control-
led by all entrepreneurs, and not only innova-
tors. 
The issues which occupied Sehumpeter's 
attention were economic development, cycles, 
profit as a surplus derived from innovation, and 
interest as a payment derived from the exis-
tence of that profit. Consequently, although he 
did not wish to press his attacks on the theory of 
general equilibrium, his scientific discoveries 
furnished very solid grounds for a critique of 
the neo-classical model based on the theoret-
ical apparatus of the marginal utility school. 
^ ' I n Business Cycles, Schumpeter writes that "it is, 
perhaps, best to avoid altogether a term which has been the 
source of so much confusion and to replace it by what it 
means in every case —equipment or intermediate goods 
and so on— and this we shall do, except in cases in which no 
misunderstanding is likely to arise. But it is suggested that 
those two monetary concepts [interest and capital] open a 
serviceable door by which to introduce the element of 
money into general theory. Only the second is, however, 
relevant here. Capital in this sense is not goods but bal-
ances, not a factor of production but a distinct agent which 
stands between the entrepreneur and the factors. It can be 
created by banks because balances can. Its increase and 
decrease are not the same as increase and decrease of com-
modities or any particular class of commodities. Its market 
is simply the money market, and there is no other capital 
market. No realistic meaning attaches to the statement that, 
in the latter, 'capital' (= some kind or other of producers' 
goods) is being 'lent in the form of money'. But again as in 
the case of interest it is necessary to add that the introduc-
tion into our analysis of this concept of capital does not do 
away with the problems of what is traditionally referred to 
as real capital —on the contrary, they reappear though in a 
new garb— and that results arrived at by means of a mone-
tary theory of capital do not always invalidate, but in many 
cases only reformulate, the propositions of 'real' theories of 
capital. If our understanding of the processes of capitalist 
society hinges in important respects on realizing the fact 
that monetary capital is a distinct agent, it also hinges in not 
less important respects on realizing how it is related to the 
world oí commodities". J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles 
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939). vol. I, p. 129. 
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V 
Global surplus, distribution surplus and 
entrepreneurial surplus 
1. The concept of the global surplus31 
T h e term "global economic surplus" might be 
applied, in its broadest sense, to that part of the 
social product which is not appropiated by 
those who have directly contributed to genera-
ting it by means of their personal labour. The 
exposition below, however, will be clearest if 
we distinguish two components of the overall 
concept of the economic surplus: the 'distribu-
tion surplus ' and the 'entrepreneurial surplus'. 
T h e distribution surplus is a condition of 
the existence of the civilized and urban socie-
ties which began to emerge more than five mi-
llennia ago, founded on systems of slave labour 
—as it is of all class societies in which some 
members of the society enjoy a dispensation 
from contributing their own labour to ensure 
the reproduction of the life of the society. The 
very feature which characterizes the recipients 
of the surplus is that there is no connexion 
be tween the product they appropriate and the 
labour they contribute. 
Within contemporary capitalist societies, 
there is a global surplus, which may be broken 
down into a 'distribution surplus', correspon-
ding to the different types of payment to the 
State and to owners of property made by capita-
list enterprises, and an entrepreneurial sur-
plus, which remains as a balance in the form of 
profit. Both economic forms of the surplus also 
exist in the centrally planned societies, but in 
•"We should not overlook here the fact that Baran and 
Bettelheim, in their basic approach to the real economic 
surplus, maintain that it coincides with the excess of the 
social product over current consumption. However, from a 
sociological angle, it would appear preferable to regard the 
surplus as an income not derived from personal labour. See 
Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New 
York, Monthly Review Press, 1957), and Charles Bettel-
heim, Planeación y Crecimiento Acelerado, trans. Ramón 
Ramírez Gómez (Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económi-
ca, 1965). 
obviously different institutional and socio-po-
litical circumstances.32 
For the sake of simplicity, we will consider 
a 'pure ' capitalist system with no public enter-
prises. Alternatively, we can consider public 
enterprises -—self-financing through the sale 
of the goods they produce— as falling into the 
generic category of'enterprises'. 
Those who are provided with incomes by 
the State —Cabinet ministers, judges, legisla-
tors, bureaucrats, members of the armed forces 
and police, members of the diplomatic corps, 
and so on— receive remuneration which forms 
part of the distribution surplus, because they 
do not contribute directly to generating the glo-
bal product produced by enterprises, and do 
not finance their incomes with the sale of 
goods, but with part of the revenues of the 
State. Thus the existence of a distribution sur-
plus is a prior and necessary condition for the 
existence in economic terms of these public 
servants. 
In order to understand the significance of 
the distribution surplus as presented in this 
article, and of the entrepeurial surplus as pre-
sented by Prebisch, it is best to begin with the 
concept of surplus value in Marx and to under-
stand the theoretical difficulties which arise in 
connexion with the realization of this surplus 
value. These difficulties relate to what we have 
called a 'zero-sum game'. Let us examine how 
Marx himself outlines the difficulty, and how 
he endeavours to solve it. For that purpose it is 
necessary to reproduce his argument at some 
length. 
12 This distinction relates to the different types of ma-
chinery for appropriation which operate in each case. Con-
cerning the social use of these forms of the surplus, we 
might perhaps speak of a surplus for consumption and a 
surplus for accumulation. However, it is possible that part 
of the former may be invested and part of the latter con-
sumed, so that these analytical distinctions overlap in prac-
tice. 
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Marx states that 'before commodity capital 
is converted back into productive capital, and 
before the surplus value it contains can be in-
vested, it must be transformed into money. 
Where does this money come from? This is a 
difficult problem at first sight, and one which 
has not been solved to date by Tooke or any 
other author. 
"Le t us assume that the outlay of £ 500 of 
working capital in the form of money capital, 
whatever its period of turnover, represents the 
entire working capital of the society, i.e., of the 
capitalist class, and that the surplus value totals 
£ 100. How does the capitalist class as a whole 
contrive to withdraw <£ 600 continuously from 
circulation if it continuously places in circula-
tion only £ 500? 
"First the money capital of £ 500 is trans-
formed into productive capital; then, in the pro-
cess of production, the latter is transformed into 
commodity capital of <£ 600 and places in circu-
lation not only commodity capital of £ 500, 
equal to the original outlay of money capital, 
bu t also a newly produced surplus value of 
£100. 
"The additional surplus value of <£ 100 is 
placed in circulation in the form of commodi-
ties. This is incontestable. But the additional 
money required for the circulation of the addi-
tional value in commodities cannot emerge 
from this same operation. 
"Therefore we must not attempt to avoid 
the difficulty by means of evasions of greater or 
lesser plausibility."33 
A few paragraphs later Marx writes: 
" In fact, however paradoxical this may ap-
pear at first sight, it is the capitalist class itself 
which places in circulation the money that is 
used to realize the surplus value contained in 
the commodities. However, it does not place 
this money in circulation as an outlay of money, 
i.e., as capital, but as a means of paying for its 
individual consumption. Consequently, it is 
not money advanced by the capitalist class, al-
though this represents the starting point for its 
circulation". Later, he continues: 
"At the end of the year our capitalist places 
Marx, op. cit., vol. II. 
in circulation a value of £ 6,00034 in commodi-
ties and sells it. In this way he receives back: 
(1) his outlay of ¿65,000 of money capital; (2) the 
surplus value of £ 1,000 converted into money. 
The capitalist has made an outlay of £5,000, or 
has placed it in circulation as capital, and with-
draws from circulation £ 6,000: £5,000 which 
represents the capital and £ 1,000 the surplus 
value. This £ 1,000 is realized in money form 
together with the money which he himself has 
placed in circulation, not as a capitalist but as a 
consumer. Now this £ 1,000 returns to him as 
the money form of the surplus value produced 
by him. And thenceforth the same operation is 
repeated each year. However, from the second 
year onwards, the £1,000 spent by him already 
constitutes the transformed form, the money 
form of the surplus value he produces. A sur-
plus value which he spends each year, and 
which each year returns to him."35 
Thus runs Marx's explanation for the case 
of simple reproduction, where there is no pro-
cess of growth in capital accumulation. But how 
do the capitalists go about releasing precisely 
the quantity of money which enables them to 
reproduce, in the form of money, exactly the 
surplus value which 'corresponds to them' in 
accordance with the calculation in terms of 
labour time? If they did not the rate of surplus 
value in the form of money might not be the 
same as the rate of surplus value in the form of 
labour. This dilemma is resolved in the sphere 
of circulation, and not in the sphere of produc-
tion —in terms of purchasing power, and not in 
terms of social labour. 
The same question arises in the cases of 
extended reproduction, where capital is accu-
mulated and the physical magnitude of the 
goods traded grows. It is this situation of expan-
sion, moreover, which is historically signifi-
cant. Marx poses the problem here with a ques-
tion which does not cover the principal difficul-
ty. In this regard he observes: "and here we 
As the reader will observe, the figures in pounds 
sterling used by Marx in this second example differ from 
those used in the first. This change of scale, however, in no 
way affects the essential argument, as will be clear to any 
reader who takes the trouble to refer to the original text. 
Mlhid. 
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encounter again the same problem which arose 
above: where does the additional money come 
from to realize the additional surplus value 
which now exists in the form of commodi-
ties?"3 6 
In fact this is not the important question, 
which is: How is it introduced in the mecha-
nism oí circulation and, crucially, how is it in-
troduced in sufficient and necessary amounts 
to realize the surplus value? If it is introduced 
in the form of an income paid by the enter-
prises, it must represent one more payment 
which must be acounted for under one more or 
less precise heading or another. But every pay-
men t for a factor of production forms part of the 
value of the product at factor cost. This pay-
ment may take the form of rent to owners of 
property, a wage for labour or for 'managerial 
responsibilities' , and so on. Whatever the justi-
fication, this payment or remuneration will rep-
resent a cost for the enterprises and will not 
he lp to account for the profit. If it is a payment 
attributable as a cost incurred by the enter-
prises, we find ourselves within the 'zero-sum 
game' . It is not possible that the enterprises 
taken as a group should receive back in the 
form of income more than the amount which 
left them in the form of payments of factors; and 
consequently the macro-economic profit will 
be nil. 
The principal cause of these obscurities 
and complexities obviously lies in the fact that 
the approach is based on a mistaken view of 
economic values, and is static in nature.37 The 
Marxian theory of value and surplus value is 
expressed in terms of social labour and refers to 
the sphere of production. The undeniable dif-
ficulties which Marx encountered in the sphere 
of realization arise from his mistaken efforts to 
calculate surplus value and profit before the 
goods undergo the test of the market. This cal-
culation is carried out assuming general market 
equil ibrium and equivalence in exchange. Pro-
ceeding on the basis of these two assumptions, 
which not only simplify the analysis but also 
™lkid. 
^ Static in the precise sense that no account is taken of 
t ime lags which form an essential part of the explanation 
relating to the very existence ot macro-economic surplus 
value. 
distort it, Marx is able to calculate his surplus 
value directly in terms of social labour. 
What actually happens, however, is differ-
ent. The appropriation of the distribution sur-
plus —payments to owners of property and 
taxes to the State originating from the enter-
prises— derives from a concrete market pro-
cess which distributes general purchasing 
power in favour of these recipients. Further-
more, the appropriation of the entrepreneurial 
surplus involves a more complex dynamic pro-
cess in which there is a time lag between the 
sphere of production and the sphere of circula-
tion. 
2. The distribution surplus 
The property-owning class and the State do not 
appropriate the surplus directly, and enter-
prises cannot do so either. The total social prod-
uct must be converted into commodities and be 
realized in the market. But who will buy that 
proportion of the commodities in which the 
distribution surplus is imbodied, and with 
what incomes? More precisely: what is the 
specifically capitalist mechanism for the appro-
priation of the distribution surplus? 
It is clear that part of the capital which 
flows from the enterprises is converted into 
different forms of payments to owners of pro-
perty and taxes to the State which entrepre-
neurs must pay in order to secure control of the 
means of production they require but do not 
necessarily possess, and to comply with the 
prevailing tax regulations. 
For the sake of simplicity we might apply 
the term rents to the various payments which 
are appropriated by the owners of means of 
production who transfer them to the enter-
prises. These payments form part of the value 
of the final product at factor cost, and together 
indicate the power of the recipients of these 
rents to appropriate a portion of the total in-
come. 
The 'owners' —understood here as a sub-
class distinct from that of 'entrepreneurs'— use 
part of the rents they receive to compete, in the 
markets for final consumption goods, with the 
wage incomes of the workers, with the aim of 
acquiring a share of the social product which, 
when deducted from the purchasing power of 
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the workers, acquires the social form of a dis-
tribution surplus. The same occurs with the 
taxes payable to the State. 
Through the medium of the incomes 
which enterprises pay to the owners of proper-
ty and to the State, there is an increase in the 
magnitude of the 'nominal ' or monetary flow of 
global income over and above that which corre-
sponds to total money wages. In this way the 
purchasing power of each unit of income is 
diluted, because the general level of prices in 
the market for consumer goods is higher than it 
would have been if wages had been the only 
component of total incomes. 
I t should be noted that this 'dilution' of the 
general purchasing power of each unit of mone-
tary income does not necessarily imply an infla-
tionary process, because payments to owners of 
property are a permanent structural component 
of the distribution of income. If for the sake of 
simplicity we assume theoretical conditions of 
a Schupeterian circular flow, then prices will 
be stabilized at a certain level which is higher 
than if wages had been the only monetary in-
come. 
This form of appropriation of the part of the 
social product which flows towards the proper-
ty-owning class is based on a specifically mar-
ket mechanism, founded in turn on a specific 
manne r of distributing general purchasing 
power. 
In the final analysis this distribution sur-
plus is a reflection of the complex power rela-
tions which underlie each social structure. 
However, since the entrepreneurs will receive 
back only as much money as they introduced 
into circulation, this explanation is necessary 
but not sufficient to cover all the components 
of the global surplus, since in the conditions 
outlined so far profit could not exist as a ma-
cro-economic magnitude. But a capitalist sys-
tem without profit lacks all historical validity. 
Consequent ly, this calls for a thorough exami-
nation of the dynamic mechanisms which ac-
count for the entrepreneurial surplus. 
Before continuing, however, it should be 
stressed that the interpretation of the distribu-
tion surplus set forth here is not compatible 
with the prevailing theories of value in condi-
tions of equilibrium, according to which the 
relative prices of commodities are proportional 
to their social labour content, or to the marginal 
preferences of their consumers.38 
Strictly speaking, the economic value of a 
commodity is an expression of the relative mag-
ni tude of general purchasing power which 
must be exerted in order to acquire it. It does 
not depend on the labour invested in generat-
ing it, or on the 'average' or 'marginal' 'utility' (a 
metaphysical concept) ascribed to it. Economic 
value is thus a phenomenon of power, and is 
expressed through the structure of society. 
3. The entrepeneurial surplus 
Having drawn a conceptual distinction regard-
ing the distribution surplus —as we have en-
deavoured to describe it here— we will now 
turn to the 'entrepreneurial surplus' and refer 
to Prebisch's argument mentioned above. 
Prebisch speaks of a surplus tout court. We 
suggest, however, that the present conceptual 
distinction is necessary. Viewed historically, 
the process of economic development has tra-
ditionally been marked by two basic features: a 
systematic increase in the productivity of hu-
man labour, and an equally constant increase in 
population and the employment of labour 
power. Capital accumulation is the means by 
which rises are achieved in both productivity 
and employment, which at first sight have con-
tradictory implications. Rises in productivity 
reflect a fall in the amount of living labour per 
unit of final product, whereas rises in employ-
ment permit an increase in the total amount of 
3 8 The basic line of argument in this explanation may be 
found in the works of P. J, Proudhon, who clearly postulates 
this 'dilution* of wage earners' purchasing power by virtue 
of the additional demand based on the use of incomes from 
property. In general, this explanation is regarded as trivial 
and superficial by the theorists who have accepted general 
equilibrium as a situation towards which the workings of 
the market tend. See Marx's criticism of Proudhon in The 
Poverty of Philosophy (1847). See also Bohm-Bawerk's cri-
ticism in his monumental work Capital and Interest ( 1884-
1889). With regard to the present subject see Proudhon'» 
Système des contradictions économiques ou Philosophie 
de la misère, (first published in 1846), with introduction 
and notes by Roger Picard (Paris, Librairie des sciences 
politiques et sociales, 1923), 2 vols. As an economist Proud-
hon undoubtedly had by no means a systematic training, 
and his theoretical observations in this field are frequently 
superficial and contradictory. In this exposition of the dis-
tribution surplus we have cited only his principal thesis. 
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living labour within each period of production. 
Obviously, in order for a decline in the 
living labour time per unit of final product to be 
compatible with an increase in the total labour 
incorporated in the economic system, the social 
product must grow. The relationship between 
these three magnitudes may be tackled mathe-
matically. Thus, for example, if productivity is 
growing at 2% and there is a need to create jobs 
at a rate of 3%, it will be necessary for the social 
product to grow at 5% over the period in ques-
tion. Against the background of these condi-
tions of growth in the product and in employ-
ment , Prebisch explains the emergence of an 
entrepreneurial surplus as follows. 
Firstly, there is a time lag between the 
circuits of production and circulation, so that 
the incomes generated in the system are spent 
before the emergence for sale of the social 
product generated against payment of those in-
comes. For the sake of simplicity we might say 
that today's income is used to purchase yester-
day's product. 
Secondly, if productivity is increasing, the 
product will have a lower 'human cost' in terms 
of the labour time invested to produce each 
unit. Accordingly, if the average wage per man-
hour has not changed, its total unit economic 
cost will have fallen. 
However, since employment, and conse-
quently the total value of wages, are increasing, 
the incomes which will be applied to purchas-
ing the product will have a higher value, and 
this will lead to a struggle of demand which 
will permit the total realization of the entire 
supply without any need for reductions in 
price, and even with the possibility of rises in 
the general price level. At the same time, how-
ever, this process is perfectly compatible —at 
least in theory— with a situation of price stabil-
ity. For that purpose it is sufficient for the rise 
in incomes generated and spent to occur at the 
same rate as the rise in the physical quantity of 
final goods and services. 
Thirdly, if this process is to occur, it is 
necessary for the working capital of the eco-
nomic system to be growing so that this con-
stant expansion in economic activity and in em-
ployment can be financed through the inev-
itable growth in money. This is an incomplete 
summary of the explanation furnished by Pre-
bisch concerning the closed appropriation of 
the increases in labour productivity made pos-
sible by the existence of an entrepreneurial 
surplus. 
4. 'Closed' appropriation and the 
entrepreneurial surplus 
With regard to the entrepreneurial surplus, de-
scribed in outline in the previous section, there 
is one aspect which may perhaps require clari-
fication. It is theoretically possible to conceive 
a situation where prices are falling in the same 
proportions as productivity is rising, but where 
nevertheless the entrepreneurial surplus per-
sists. 
The sole condition for the existence of the 
entrepreneurial surplus is that within each pe-
riod average total unit costs should be lower 
than average unit prices. Prices may be declin-
ing at the same rate as unit costs, though always 
remaining proportionately higher than the lat-
ter. This will permit the existence of a perman-
ent surplus in the enterprises together with 
parallel declines in the prices and unit costs of 
final products. 
Let us assume a simplified situation with 
only two social classes: on the one hand, entre-
preneurs/property owners/financiers, and on 
the other wage-paid workers. If employment 
grows at a rate of 3% and productivity at 2%, the 
physical product will expand by 5%. 
Let us assume that monetary wages per 
worker remain constant; then total monetary 
wages will increase by 3%. These wages, in our 
simplified example, represent the totality of 
the available income in each period; therefore, 
if the quantities produced increase by 5% and 
the incomes which will furnish demand for 
them by 3%, prices will fall at the same rate as 
productivity is rising. 
In order for the surplus to disappear, it will 
be necessary for prices to fall by 5%; in other 
words, the fall in prices must correspond not to 
the increased productivity, but to the in-
creased output. 
In the development of Prebisch's argu-
ment this difference is not always sufficiently 
emphasized, although there are some passages 
where it is stressed more clearly. Thus, for ex-
ample, Prebisch observes that: 
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" In the upward movement of production 
each circuit calls for more employment than the 
one before, and, in consequence, generates 
more income and more aggregate demand. And 
this greater demand partly accounts for the fact 
that the prices of the goods whose circuit is 
completed do not fall correlatively with the 
increase in production due to additional em-
ployment and higher productivity."39 
Although in the example used here prices 
fall correlatively with the rise in productivity 
(2%), there will be a surplus because they do 
not fall correlatively with the increase in output 
(5%).4° The workers appropriate all the in-
crease in productivity, but not all the increase 
in output. 
Obviously rises in productivity can also 
undergo 'closed' appropriation, at least in part. 
This means that it is conceivable that part of 
these increases may be converted into a distri-
bution surplus, with no rise in the real wages of 
the labour force. We shall endeavour to explain 
this point in the next section. 
5. Interrelations between the global surplus, 
the distribution surplus and the 
entrepreneurial surplus 
T h e distribution surplus will be viewed here, 
in a simplified manner, as the real income ap-
propriated in the form of rents by the owners of 
property —rural or urban— and in the form of 
taxes by the State. 
Le t us assume that only enterprises pay 
taxes and rents, in addition to remuneration to 
workers. This assumption raises the share of 
wages in total income, which would be lower if 
we accepted that wage earners also have to pay 
rents and taxes. Likewise, if rent recipients 
paid taxes, total net incomes in the form of rents 
3 9 Raúl Prebisch, "Socio-economic structure and crisis 
of peripheral capitalism", CEPAL Review, No. 6 (second 
ha I fo f l978) ,p . 190. 
4 0 In order for prices to fall correlatively with the rise in 
output of final goods, the value of the monetary income 
required to produce this rise must remain constant. If in 
period 1 the physical quantity produced is 100 units, and 
the monetary income generated and spent is $ 1,000, 
average prices will stand at 10. If the product doubles in 
period 2, with a constant flow of incomes, prices will fall to 
5 if all the income is translated into effective demand. 
would decline by that same amount to the ben-
efit of the State. 
The entrepreneurial surplus is the net 
excess at the end of each economic period 
which the enterprises hold as a balance after 
payment of wages, rents and taxes. The global 
surplus is the sum of the distribution surplus 
and the entrepreneurial surplus at the end of 
each period. Finally, the difference between 
the total income (including profit) and the 
global surplus should correspond to the earn-
ings of workers in the private sector. 
This reasoning is carried out in terms of 
real income, since the purchasing power as-
cribed to the possession of each monetary unit 
of income remains constant. We will further 
assume a situation of growing employment 
with periodic increases in productivity. 
In these general conditions it is possible to 
conceive of a dynamic process in which the 
growing labour force appropriates only part of 
the increases in labour productivity, the re-
mainder of these increases being converted 
into a distribution surplus and an entrepre-
neurial surplus. 
Let us assume that average labour produc-
tivity —expressed in units of final product per 
worker employed during the period— is 
growing at a rate of 2%, and the number of 
workers employed at 3%. This means that the 
total number of units produced is growing at a 
rate of 5%. If individual wages are growing at 
1%, and employment at 3%, then total wages 
will necessarily be growing at a rate of 4%. The 
growth in wages is not sufficient to absorb' the 
growth in the physical product. As a result, in 
order that demand should not fall and that 
prices should not decline, it is necessary for the 
payments made by the enterprises to the recip-
ients of the distribution surplus to grow at such 
a rate that, on the assumption of price stability, 
it will be possible for global income to grow at 
the same rate — 5 % — as the physical product. 
This process can reproduce itself in a 
stable manner, with the global surplus growing 
more rapidly, and total wages more slowly, 
than the total product. 
The labour force appropriates only a part of 
the increases in productivity, since average 
individual money wages are rising at a rate of 
1%, while productivity is increasing by 2%. 
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Total unit costs and the general price level 
remain constant because the physical quantity 
of the final product is growing at the same rate 
as monetary incomes. And the enterpreneurial 
surplus is growing at more or less the same rate 
as the total product. 
In this example the entire rise in produc-
tivity is transferred to costs as a result of a rise in 
the remuneration received by the owners of the 
In this section we will pursue our examination 
of the concept of the economic surplus which 
remains in the enterprises, as recently ad-
vanced by Raúl Prebisch, which cannot be 
separated from his general view of peripheral 
development and his specific concerns re-
garding this broad range of issues. 
T h e presentation of his argument is linked 
with and old issue which has always been a 
concern of his —the social forms of appropria-
tion of the benefits of growing productivity. 
Prebisch originally analysed this question 
in order to subject to critical examination the 
theory of comparative advantages which then 
predominated in international trade. He 
argued that productivity increases in produc-
tion of the manufactures exported by the cen-
tral countries led to a proportionally smaller 
drop in unit costs because workers in the 
centres had greater power to increase their real 
wages in line with the rise in productivity. At 
the same time he postulated that prices did not 
tend to coincide with unit economic costs or to 
decl ine in proportion to the falls in such costs in 
the case of the manufactures exported by the 
centres, because the income elasticity of 
demand for those products was greater than 
unity.41 
"Theoretical and practical problems of economic 
growth" (E/CN.12/221). 
factors —wage earners and rent recipients— 
and by the State. As a result, total unit costs 
remain constant. 
The distribution surplus, which in our 
example grows faster than total wages, forms 
part of the economic cost which must be borne 
by the enterprises in order to constitute their 
productive power, or, to put it more simply, to 
be able to produce. 
Thus this difference between average 
prices and unit costs with regard to each specif-
ic level of rising labour productivity led to the 
'closed' appropriation of part of the benefits of 
technical progress, either by the owners of the 
factors of production, or by the exporting enter-
prises in the centres.42 
The concept of the surplus now proposed 
by the same author cannot be considered inde-
pendent ly of this background. 
At the end of the 1940s these reflections 
led him to adopt an unorthodox and controver-
sial position concerning the comparative ad-
vantages derived from the international divi-
sion of labour which began to take shape with 
the industrial revolution. These same con-
cerns, now viewed from a different angle, are 
now reflected in an equally unorthodox and 
controversial approach to the concept of the 
economic surplus. 
4 Z " T h e academic discussion, however, is far from 
ended. In economics, ideologies usually tend either to lag 
beh ind events or to outlive them. It is true that the reason-
ing on the economic advantages of the international divi-
sion of labour is theoretically sound, but it is usually for-
gotten that it is based upon an assumption which has been 
conclusively proved false by facts. According to this as-
sumption, the benefits of technical progress tend to be 
distributed alike over the whole community, either by the 
lowering of prices or the corresponding raising of in-
comes". Raúl Prebisch, "The economic development of 
Latin America and its principal problems", Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VII, N.° 1 (February 1962), 
p . 1. 
VI 
Development, disequilibrium and 
the surplus in Prebisch 
E C O N O M I C DEVELOPMENT AND THEORIES OF VALUE / Armando Di Filippo 105 
In both cases he deals with the fact that 
average prices and unit costs fail to coincide or 
to behave symmetrically, and with their influ-
ence on the distribution of the benefits of the 
growing productivity of human labour.43 
Now, this phenomenon has been consid-
ered a temporary 'anomaly' because it clashes 
with two fundamental aspects of the prevailing 
economic approaches. The first is the claimed 
tendency of the economic system to assume 
positions of stable equilibrium; the second 
relates to the prevailing theories of value, 
ei ther in their subjective marginal utility 
version —specific to the neo-classical liberal 
school— or in the classical and Marxian labour 
theories of value. 
However, the view of capitalist develop-
ment which is implicit in Prebisch's theory 
regards this discrepancy between prices, costs 
and productivity levels as structural in nature 
and inherent in the logic of the system. Hence 
general disequilibrium is the very nature of the 
system, and a necessary requirement for its 
survival. More precisely, it is a condition for 
the existence of macro-economic profit. 
Notwithstanding the affirmations of the 
neo-classical economists, macro-economic 
profit is the central category which must be ex-
plained in the interpretation of capitalist devel-
opment . Any model or paradigm which does 
not succeed in explaining profit will have left 
aside both the basic motivation driving the 
system and the essential source of the process 
of accumulation. This applies to the static 
model of perfect competition which, in condi-
tions of stable equilibrium, reaches the conclu-
sion that profit is nil. In short, for the neo-
' Prebisch distinguishes between two sources of pos-
sible changes in total unit costs: those which derive from a 
change in productivity, assuming stability in the unit price 
or income received by the owners of factors of production 
—and especially workers— and those which derive from 
changes in these real incomes. If the unit incomes of the 
factors remain stable, the rise in real productivity will 
automatically be shifted to costs, which will fall propor-
tionately, If incomes rise at the same time as productivity, 
unit prices will not fall. Hence "if, in spite of greater tech-
nical progress in industry than in primary production, the 
price relation has moved against the latter instead of in its 
favour, it would seem that the average income, per capita, 
has risen more in industrial centres than in the producer 
countries of the periphery". Ibid., p. 6. 
classical school the tendencies towards posi-
tions of stable equilibrium mean that the in-
comes of the factors rise (or that prices fall) pari 
passu with rises in productivity and permit the 
appropriation of the benefits of technical pro-
gress by a broad spectrum of society, elim-
inating any surplus whose existence and man-
ner of appropriation would call in question the 
equity of the system. 
The labour theory of value also assumes 
positions of stable equilibrium. Prices are pro-
portional to values, and changes in values are 
inversely proportional to rises in productivity. 
Under the 'law of value', goods are exchanged 
in quantities proportional to their abstract 
labour content. For Marx, the existence of a 
surplus results from a phenomenon of exploita-
tion which is based on his theory of value, and 
is perfectly compatible with a situation of gen-
eral equilibrium in all markets. What is more, 
his theory makes it obligatory to proceed from 
this situation of general equilibrium, as a proof 
that the surplus is a phenomenon arising from 
exploitation. 
In short, the predominant theories of 
value are valid only in stable conditions of 
general equilibrium. 
However, in such conditions the theories 
do not account for the essential condition for 
the existence of capitalism as a viable economic 
system: that the macro-economic profit should 
be positive in value. 
Until our static and 'economistic' approach 
to the mechanics o'f the process of attributing 
value44 is suitably modified, it will not be pos-
sible to understand the theoretical significance 
of the solutions proposed by Prebisch for the 
recurrent discrepancy between prices and pro-
ductivity level. 
The concept of the surplus retained by the 
enterprises which Prebisch postulates is 
dynamic because its very existence, in the form 
of macro-economic profit, depends on the 
mechanisms which make its appropriation pos-
sible and which can only be understood 
through a dynamic analysis. 
44 We refer here to the process whereby a unit price is 
attributed to the goods which are traded in the market. 
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And this dynamic approach brings us to the 
need to reconsider some basic macro-economic 
magni tudes . 
Within each period considered, the value 
of the income which is generated is not equal to 
the total cost of the product being offered for 
sale. The difference between the two is, pre-
cisely, the entrepreneurial surplus. 
Income measures a potential product or 
productive power which has been constituted 
but not yet consumed or realized; the product 
measures a real volume of final goods which are 
for sale, each valued at unit cost. However, the 
two magnitudes are compared during each 
period, and from their comparison stems the 
entrepreneurial surplus. Once the goods are 
realized the product, now including the macro-
economic profit, is the same as the income. 
Before realization, the total value of the 
product being offered for sale is equal to its cost 
of supply, and corresponds to the incomes paid 
for its manufacture. 
In the circumstances of a development 
process, which are those of interest to Prebisch 
and those which are historically significant in 
the analysis of capitalism, labour power is con-
stantly supplying a potential quantum of out-
p u t which is higher than the real 'quantum' it 
can acquire with the incomes derived from that 
transfer. 
Marx would apply the term 'exploitation' 
to this phenomenon, arguing that the value of 
the labour power is lower than the value of the 
products of the labour performed by it. He 
would consider the difference as surplus value, 
and would explain it on the basis of his labour 
theory of value, which is essentially static. 
When Prebisch encounters the same 
phenomenon, he elaborates a radically differ-
ent explanation. This explanation is not com-
patible with any of the theories of value cur-
rently in contention in the field of economic 
thought. In order to understand this radical 
change of perspective fully, it is necessary to 
start from the concept of purchasing power. 
Within each period, entrepreneurs use the 
money they control —their own or borrowed 
money— in order to buy commodities from one 
another and acquire the services of the owners 
of factors of production. The money thus used 
behaves like capital.45 This generates two 
effects which occur successively. Firstly, 
within the same period monetary incomes are 
generated which are the counterpart of a poten-
tial product that will exist only in subsequent 
periods. Secondly, during subsequent periods 
the final goods emerge which are the counter-
part of those monetary incomes, which have 
already been generated and spent. 
If w e now replace our diachronic approach 
by a synchronic one, we shall see that the in-
come generated within each period fulfils two 
functions. The first is to measure the pur-
chasing power of the money-capital spent by 
the entrepreneurs in order to secure the use of 
the factors of production. The second is to mea-
sure the purchasing power of the income re-
ceived by the labour force and the owners of 
the factors of production. When this money 
leaves the coffers of the entrepreneurs for the 
pockets of wage earners and the other owners 
of factors of production, it constitutes the use of 
capital and also the generation of income. The 
purchasing power of this use of capital is mea-
sured with respect to the quantity and price of 
the factors of production whose services have 
been acquired. When it immediately46 leaves 
the pockets of the recipients of incomes (wage 
earners, rent recipients, and so on) for the pur-
chase of final products, it becomes a use of 
income or final demand. The purchasing po-
wer of this use of monetary income, or final 
demand, is measured with respect to the quan-
tity and price of the final consumption goods 
acquired. 
A single monetary magnitude thus links 
together, within a single time period, two real 
magnitudes: that of the purchasing power of 
the working capital spent to secure the use of 
the means of production, and that of the pur-
chasing power of the income used to express 
demand for final consumption goods. 
Now, if we are in a situation of expansion, 
with growth in employment, and if we assume 
' That is, capital in the form of money, which is applied 
directly to production through the acquisition of means of 
production or the right to use them. 
Here we assume that there are no gaps in effective 
demand and that the entire income is converted into final 
demand within each period under consideration. 
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that today's production will be tomorrow's 
supply, the growing total monetary incomes 
which are paid to the owners of the factors of 
production, and in particular to wage-earning 
workers, when immediately spent, encounter 
supply whose overall cost is lower than that of 
the incomes. The difference constitutes the 
entrepreneurial surplus, whose value is the 
macro-economic profit. 
Prebisch's theory concerning profit and 
the entrepreneurial surplus had already been 
vaguely sensed and outlined by a representa-
tive of Utopian or pre-Marxist socialism.47 Both 
the classical economists and Karl Marx, in 
discussing value and surplus value, eliminate 
explicit consideration of the time factor and 
modify the nature of the reasoning. In addition, 
their traditional contempt for monetary phe-
nomena, which they felt obscured reality, pre-
vented them from adopting the dynamic view 
required in order to grasp this concept of the 
surplus. 
Prebisch's reasoning explicitly reintro-
duces the time factor and is closer to the con-
ception indistinctly perceived by Sismondi 
than to the classics or Marx. The idea devel-
oped in his two latest studies was foreshad-
owed in a short passage in the Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1949, where he stated 
that: " I t is obvious that the increase in income 
has its counterpart in the value of the goods and 
services the production of which yields this 
income". And he adds in a footnote: "This 
statement is theoretically incorrect, as in any 
process of increasing production the cash in-
come is always greater than the value of the 
finished production".48 In this way, as early as 
"A combination may arise, in opposition to land, of 
the other two sources of wealth: life, which makes work 
possible, and capital, which sustains it through the wage. 
When these two powers are combined they jointly possess 
a force for growth, .so that the labour performed by the 
labourer this year is worth more than the labour of the pre-
vious year, with which the worker is supporting himself, 
Because of this appreciation, industry obtains a constant 
increase in wealth which can either form the incomes of the 
industrious classes or add to their capital". J. Simonde de 
Sismondi, Nouveaux principes d'économie politique, 2nd. 
ed. (France, 1827), quoted in Pedro Bravo, éd., Socialismo 
Premarxista (Caracas, Universidad Central, Instituto de 
Estudios Políticos, 1961), pp. 72-73. (Emphasis added.) 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. 1951.II.G.1), p. 10. 
1949, though not explicitly, he looks forward to 
the machinery for the appropriation of profit.49 
Another Latin American structuralist, 
Celso Furtado, took up the same idea without 
developing its theoretical implications, al-
though he outlined it fairly precisely. Furtado 
states that: "Taking an industrial economy as a 
whole, we find that within the value of each 
article sold are included the payments for all 
factors participating in its production. The 
price of a yard of cloth is basically the sum of 
the payments for labour (wages), capital (inter-
est, rents, lease of land, etc.), and the entrepre-
neur (profit). In paying for labour and other 
factors in advance of sale, the entrepreneur 
carries out a credit operation: he is advancing a 
part of the value of a yard of cloth that is going to 
be sold in the future. On the other hand, when 
he sells his yard of cloth the entrepreneur gets 
back not only those payments he has already 
made but also an additional payment which 
constitutes the profit. Hence this additional 
payment amounts to a kind of credit operation 
in reverse: it is an amount of income incorpo-
rated into the value of the yard of cloth sold, and 
which remains in liquid form in the hands of 
the entrepreneur. In other words, the profit 
coming into the possession of the entrepreneur 
is the counterpart of the value of other goods 
which are being produced and have not yet 
been sold" (emphasis added).5*' 
Unfortunately, Furtado did not elaborate 
further on this idea, nor did he go deeper into 
its scope and dynamic implications, which are 
clearly related to Prebisch's reflections on the 
closed appropriation of the benefits of growing 
labour productivity. 
Nevertheless, the subject is of vital impor-
tance, because profit and the surplus are given 
a dynamic interpretation which links them 
indissolubly to the theory of economic devel-
opment. 
1 Prebisch's dynamic conception of the surplus is, so to 
speak, 'latent' throughout his discussion of the economic-
cycle and its influence on profits in the centre and the 
periphery. 
Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelop-
ment, trans. Ricardo W. de Aguiar and Eric Charles 
Drysdale (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964), 
p . 111. 
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Without profit the very existence of capi-
talism is inconceivable, and profit cannot exist 
in static conditions, as is clearly shown in the 
neo-classical arguments which consider profit 
as a transitory phenomenon arising from a sit-
uation of imbalance. 
In Marx, profit is a phenomenon of exploi-
tation which is theoretically independent of 
the dynamic conditions characteristic of eco-
nomic development. His theory, which is 
unassailable on the 'real' level, encounters 
insurmountable difficulties in the sphere of the 
realization of commodities.51 
Prebisch's approach to the surplus helps to 
clarify the shortcomings in these theories, and 
enables us to draw greater benefit from their 
useful elements. 
1. Background 
Both the liberals —classical and neo-clas-
sical— and the Marxist school have endeav-
oured to establish a strict relationship between 
technical productivity and prices and incomes. 
Firstly, they have assumed that it is possible to 
attribute to the participants in the process of 
production specific shares in the product 
which derive from their personal contribu-
tions. Secondly, they have postulated that the 
economic system as such remunerates the par-
It is true that the rate of relative surplus value tends 
to grow as a result of a rise in the productivity of labour 
engaged directly or indirectly in producing means of 
subsistence for workers, which is undoubtedly a phe-
nomenon of development. But Marx's explanation, we 
repeat, is static because it takes no account aï explicit time 
lags between the spheres of production and circulation. 
Moreover, surplus value in Marx can exist even if total 
employment, output and incomes are not growing, while 
for Prebish the expansion of current incomes is a necessary 
condition for the existence of a surplus. Finally, for 
Prebiseh the surplus arises from a global macro-economic 
disequil ibrium, and is then distributed among the various 
economic activities. All this is viewed from a macro-
economic angle. 
The macro-economic approaches adopted 
by Keynes, and particularly by Kalecki, made it 
possible to view profit as a global magnitude 
whose existence has to be explained. However, 
the explicitly dynamic nature of this explana-
tion, and the conditions and mechanisms 
which permit the recurrent existence of profit 
at the macro-economic level, were not dealt 
with by those writers.32 
Prebiseh clearly faces up to this task, 
which falls within the context of his more con-
crete and comprehensive concerns relating to 
the development of Latin America. He makes 
his reflections at a time when the, theory of 
general equilibrium has reached a cul-de-sac, 
and when this fact is beginning to be recog-
nized in the Western academic world.53 
ticipants in the process of production with an 
amount of income which has a significant rela-
tionship with that contribution from an ethical, 
point of view. Thirdly, the ethical aspect of this 
relationship between productivity and income 
is regarded as inherent in the logic of the 
system and, for the Marxists, accounts for its 
intrinsic wickedness, while for the neo-
classicists it stands behind the equity inherent 
in the innermost logic of its operation. 
Fourthly, the resulting recommendations for 
action are, on the one hand, the radical transfor-
mation —generally by revolutionary means— 
of an essentially pernicious economic system 
or, on the other, the elimination of the institu-
tional or technical obstacles which make it dif-
ficult for a fundamentally equitable economic 
Kalecki has penetratingly examined more or less 
related issues, such as the effect of a general rise in wages 
on rates of profit. See "Class struggle and the distribution of 
national income", Kt/klo.s (Basle), vol. XXIV (1971), fase. I, 
PP. 1-9. 
' ' Nicholas Kaldor, "What is wrong with economic 
theory", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. LXWIX, 
No.3'(August 1975). p. 347. 
VII 
The distribution of technical progress and its benefits 
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system to achieve optimum levels of equilibri-
um and welfare, 
Now, one of the objectives laid down for 
this article was to suggest that no such strict 
relationship exists between technical producti-
vity and prices and incomes. Firstly, because it 
is not possible to identify the contribution of 
each factor of production to the product. 
Secondly, because even were such identifica-
tion possible, that would not automatically 
imply a 'merit ' which, from the ethical 
viewpoint, would justify the attribution of that 
part of the product to the owner of the factor. 
Thirdly, the logic of the capitalist system is 
such that the payments received by the owners 
of factors of production are not strictly derived 
from the contribution of those factors to produc-
tion, but from the combination of technical 
factors in the sphere of productive power with 
social factors in the sphere of purchasing po-
wer. Fourthly, intrinsic virtues or vices cannot 
be attributed to the market mechanism. It is an 
impersonal mechanism which expresses in 
terms of value —general purchasing power— 
the distribution and use of the forms of power 
which stem from the social structure. 
We will now endeavour to elaborate on 
these propositions somewhat more fully. 
Our starting point is to deny that a strict 
relationship can be established between the 
technical productivity of a factor of production 
and prices and incomes generated. We have 
already seen, following Prebisch, that there is 
no symmetry in the behaviour of prices and 
technical or real productivity levels at the level 
of each unit of production. This is due to the 
fact that the income elasticity of monetary 
demand for a good depends on certain basic 
regularities in the behaviour of consumers 
which lead to asymmetrical expansion in the 
structure of their 'baskets' of consumption. 
However, these asymmetrical orientations 
cannot be understood or formulated without 
prior knowledge of the distribution of mone-
tary income. Strictly speaking, the causal rela-
t ionship is more complex, and takes the form of 
the existance of economic and not merely tech-
nical productivity which is expressed in units 
of purchasing power. 
While changes in prices do not symmetri-
cally reflect changes in productivity, changes 
in total unit costs do not do so either. In fact, 
costs can vary for technical reasons —changes 
in needs for a factor of production per unit of 
product— or for economic reasons— changes in 
the incomes received by the owners of the 
factor as a result of changes in their purchasing 
power. These changes in relative purchasing 
power in turn reflect the complex power rela-
tionships which derive from the social struc-
ture . This is clearly incompatible with the 
theories of value formulated on the basis of 
positions of general equilibrium. 
I n t h e case of the marginal utility school, 
equilibrium and full employment are assumed 
in conditions of perfect competition. Conse-
quently, the production function necessarily 
reflects the relative provision of the factors of 
production, since all available factors are 
occupied. To ensure the logical consistency of 
this fiction a number of assumptions are neces-
sary, including the assumption of perfect tech-
nical substitutability of one factor of production 
by another. Consequently, the technical phe-
nomenon is successfully reconciled with the 
economic phenomenon. Firstly, according to 
the technical law of diminishing returns, or 
variable proportions, as the relative abundance 
of a factor increases, its contribution to the mar-
ginal product declines. Secondly, under the 
economic law of supply and demand, as the 
relative abundance of a factor increases, its 
price or remuneration tends to fall, and vice 
versa. The point of equilibrium is decided 
upon by entrepreneurs, who contract factors up 
to the point where the value of their marginal 
product is equal to their price. However, in a 
macro-economic production function, the stock 
of capital can only be expressed in values, and 
this act of attributing value to capital, under-
stood as a factor of production, demands knowl-
edge of the relative prices of capital goods. But 
at any moment in the economic process these 
relative prices of capital goods depend on the 
value of the product to whose manufacture they 
contribute. In this way, under the neo-classical 
approach, we have a tautological production 
function in which calculation of the value of the 
social product demands knowledge of the 
value of the inputs of capital goods, and calcula-
tion of the value of those capital goods demands 
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knowledge of the value of the social product54 
This tautology shows that the economic pro-
cess is not self-contained in its technical and 
mercantile relations, but that the value of the 
factors of production depends on the positions 
of power in the social structure occupied by 
those who control the factors, and these posi-
tions are reflected in the personal distribution 
of monetary income. The power relations 
which derive from those positions also deter-
mine the allocation of technical progress, 
which constantly modifies the productivity of 
the factors. 
In the labour theory of value too, and espe-
cially in the Marxian version, the technical 
phenomenon is successfully harmonized with 
the economic phenomenon, but on the basis of 
very different reasoning. 
Here we shall refer exclusively to Marx, 
because his argument enjoys particular recog-
nition in extensive academic circles. Marx 
holds that the value of a good is equal to the 
amount of labour socially necessary in average 
technical conditions to produce it. Conse-
quently, if we accept the equivalence in ex-
change postulated by the 'law' of value, prices 
will vary proportionately with values, and 
accordingly there will be open appropriation of 
technical progress and its benefits. The law of 
value operates only in conditions of general 
equilibrium; if prices fall more than propor-
tionately compared with values, for Marx this 
will mean that an 'excessive* amount of social 
labour has been allocated to the production of 
that commodity. 
In other words, when prices differ from 
values, we are in a situation of disequilibrium 
which is corrected through a reallocation of 
social labour. But in that case social labour is 
allocated firstly for tehcnical reasons, and 
secondly for economic reasons. The technical 
reasons are related to the physical productivity 
of each specific process of production, which 
Let us, for example, imagine a ease of obsolescence. 
Equipment designed for the manufacture of black and 
white television sets has a different value before and after 
the introduction of colour television, depending on the 
behaviour of demand. But this demand will in turn react 
differently depending on the distribution of monetary in-
come in the society. 
determines the amount of labour —living and 
past labour— contained in each process. The 
economic reasons stem from the structure of 
relative prices, which cannot be dissociated 
from the composition of monetary demand or, 
consequently, from the distribution of nominal 
income. 
Let us now assume that in a society with an 
income which is high per capita but exception-
ally concentrated, the poor require larger quan-
tities of bread. If increasing quantities of social 
labour are reallocated to bread production, 
prices will fall rapidly below values if the mon-
etary distribution of personal income is such 
that the poor have no money to buy it. 
In accordance with the law of the exchange 
of equivalents, society would seem to have 
allocated 'excesive' quantities of labour to the 
production of bread. Of course, demand is the 
expression of social needs backed by pur-
chasing power, and possession of this pur-
chasing power depends on the personal dis-
tribution of income. Consequendy, the alloca-
tion of social labour which corresponds to gen-
eral market equilibrium will vary with the dis-
tribution of monetary income. In short, given 
the technological structure of the economic 
system, the allocation of living social labour is a 
variable which is dependent on the distribu-
tion of monetary income. 
Marx's entire theory of exploitation is 
based on technical and institutional factors and 
is expressedin units of social labour. And since, 
by definition, to work is to create value, the 
ethical postulate that the entire product be-
longs to the worker is derived almost 'uncon-
sciously'. However, under the institution of 
private property the entire product belongs to 
the owner of capital. The rules of the game in 
the market lay down that commodities are sold 
for their value, and labour power is also sold for 
its value, which is equivalent to the amount of 
labour contained in the commodities it con-
sumes. The crux of the matter lies in ascertain-
ing how the value of labour power is deter-
mined. Marx recognizes that its real cost of pro-
duction is conditioned by historical and moral 
factors. But to reproduce labour power is to 
reproduce its readiness to work; and this readi-
ness to work to a certain degree reflects the 
purchasing power of capital and the structural 
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changes in the power relations between clas-
ses. Here we return to our concept of the distri-
bution surplus. In short, the distribution of pur-
chasing power among social classes depends in 
part on the distribution of nominal income, and 
cannot be expressed as the mere result of pro-
cesses of production calculated in terms of la-
bour t ime. 
We therefore arrive at the conclusion that 
the structure of relative prices of products 
depends on the technological structure on the 
one hand, and the distribution of monetary in-
come on the other. The magnitude and orienta-
tion of changes in the technological structure 
and in the distribution of monetary income 
depend on complex power relationships which 
stem from the social structure. 
Economists in the Latin American struc-
turalist school understood this process fairly 
early on, and gave this interpretation concrete 
form in specific diagnoses of Latin American 
societies. 
2. 'Monetary' and 'real' productivity levels 
Within the Latin American structuralist school, 
this separation in the theory between produc-
tivity levels and incomes was proposed by Aní-
bal Pinto in his article on the concentration of 
technical progress and of its benefits.55 It is 
neccessary to reproduce his argument at length 
in order to permit subsequent comparison with 
other propositions deriving from the 'Prebis-
chian ' theory of the surplus. 
" In order to throw light on the matter it is 
necessary to examine more closely the signifi-
cance and origins of the rise in productivity, 
with a distinction drawn from the outset be-
tween the real and the monetary form of the 
phenomenon. The former would correspond to 
the situations where, as a result of innovations 
in the mode or forms of production, an increase 
occurs in the volume (or quality) of the goods 
created, and where these real changes form the 
background to the raising of the incomes of the 
labour force and the owners of capital. The 
55A. Pinto, "Concentración del progreso técnico y de 
sus frutos en el desarrollo latinoamericano", El Trimestre 
Económico, No. 125 (January-March 1965). 
monetary form, in contrast, would be that in 
which the rise in payments for factors is inde-
penden t of the greater material or actual yield 
from them, as a consequence of causes external 
to the production unit or sector under consider-
ation. 
" In order to illustrate the problem more 
clearly, let us cite a few extreme examples. 
First, let us imagine the case of a firm in which 
an innovating executive or a Stakhanovite 
worker establishes a new, more effective work 
routine which, using the same resources, 
makes it possible to increase the volume of 
goods which can be made available for the 
market. This will lead to greater real produc-
tivity of the factors, and also higher monetary 
remuneration —i.e., a higher income— if there 
is no offsetting decline in prices as a result of 
the increase in supply, or other interference 
which we shall rule out in this and the other 
examples. 
"Secondly, let us imagine a firm which, 
because of a ban on the import of competing 
goods or an exchange rate devaluation, experi-
ences an overnight rise in the prices of its prod-
ucts without any rise in its costs. In this case, 
even though there has been no change in their 
real yield, there will be an increase in the in-
come of the factors, and this will be taken as a 
sign of a proportional improvement in produc-
tivity. 
"Let us now consider a more complicated 
possibility: the case of a semi-public firm 
which is established with or benefits from State 
investment which enables it to attain a relative-
ly high level of real productivity, with conse-
quent high remuneration for the factors. This 
version combines the two aspects referred to 
above; nevertheless, it is clear that the situation 
is principally due to the public investment 
which has financed the acquisition of the 
equipment for use in production." 
This argument contains two fundamental 
propositions. Firstly, that the structure of eco-
nomic (or 'monetary', to use the author's term) 
productivity levels is, at least in part, a result 
and not a cause of income distribution; and 
secondly, that behind these changes in income 
distribution function complex power relations 
which are inherent in the dynamics of the so-
cial structure. 
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Since neither changes in incomes nor 
changes in prices are tied to 'real' movements 
in technical productivity, this makes it possible 
to introduce systematically the effects of the 
dynamics of the social structure on the struc-
ture and level of relative prices. The remainder 
of Pinto's argument deals with this specific 
issue. 
The relatively independent effect of mon-
etary demand has recently been highlighted by 
Prebisch. Its clear corollary is that movements 
in prices do not symmetrically reflect move-
ments in technical productivity levels in the 
branch concerned, but the general trends of the 
economic process. At the same time, the roots 
of this asymmetrical behaviour should not be 
sought only in the monopolistic or oligopolistic 
situations which may be involved. 
Prebiseh's argument here complements 
and reinforces Pinto's, since he demonstrates 
that 'monetaiy' changes in productivity and the 
asymmetry between prices and productivity 
levels do not derive only from policy measures, 
or from power relationships which are 'exter-
nal ' to the economic process proper, but also 
from the use of the surplus which stems from 
actual global economic activity. 
There is a passage in Prebisch which hints 
at the basic logic needed to deal with this com-
plicated question: 
"It is sometimes maintained that if prices 
do not fall as productivity rises, this is due to 
the intervention of monopolistic or oligopol-
istic combinations which restrict competition, 
through customs protection, through patents or 
licences whereby competition is barred, or by 
other well-known means. This is not my inter-
pretation. What is involved is simply the same 
phenomenon of the internal distribution of the 
total surplus. Widely different cases arise: 
prices which remain static or increase, despite 
exceptional improvements in productivity, or 
in the absence of any change in productivity at 
all. In all such instances, the monopolies or 
oligopolies appropriate a larger share of the 
surplus than they would otherwise have ob-
tained. 
"The conclusion is perfectly logical. Mon-
etary expansion is brought about not by the 
action of these combinations which restrict 
competition, but by the growth rate of pro-
duction as a whole. With such combinations 
appropriating a larger share than they would 
otherwise have had, a smaller share is left for 
other goods and services, owing to the corre-
sponding shifts in demand". m 
VIII 
Conclusions: theory and ideology 
On the unsullied Olympus of some 'pure ' theo-
reticians, the views of economists from the pe-
riphery are often regarded as lacking in rigour, 
or as broadsides incapable even of scratching 
the surface of the theory set out on more 'se-
rious' foundations.57 
These foundations are, in the final analy-
sis, those which underlie theories of value in 
static conditions of general equilibrium. We 
must therefore begin this section with a ques-
tion prompted by a certain bewilderment; if the 
theories of value based on conditions of general 
5,1 Raul Prebisch, "A critique of peripheral capitalism", 
op. cit., pp. 39-40. 
' ^ I cannot resist reproducing a sample which distorts 
and crudely caricatures some structuralist ideas: "All that I 
find in Prebiseh's study and in the other literature along 
similar lines emanating from the United Nations and else-
where is the dogmatic identification of agriculture with 
poverty, and the explanation of agricultural poverty by in-
herent natural historical laws by virtue of which agricultur-
al products tend to exchange on ever-deteriorating terms 
for manufactures, technological progress tends to confine 
its blessings to manufacturing industry, and agricultural 
populations do not get the benefit of technological progress 
in manufactures even as purchasers, because the prices ot 
manufactured products do not lall with the decline in their 
real costs. These natural laws seem to me tor the most part 
mischievous fantasies, or conjectural ordisorted history, or, 
at the best, mere hypotheses, relating to specific periods 
and calling for sober and objective testing." Jacob Viner, 
International Trade and Economic Development (C.len-
eoe, 11 L, Free Press, 1952), p. 62. 
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equil ibrium do not help to explain the inner-
most nature of economic value or the concrete 
dynamics of the process of attributing value, 
then what purpose do they serve? 
There is an answer to this question. The 
theories of value based on conditions of general 
equil ibrium do not play a theoretical, but a 
'practical ' role as instruments for the scientific 
legitimation of a specific view of the world 
which justifies a 'praxis': they claim to justify 
in the field of analysis 'a pre-analytic cognitive 
act*, as Schumpeter termed it. This is no reason 
to regard them as less 'scientific', since any 
theoretical structure in the social sciences must 
necessarily be founded on a 'vision' which is 
' loaded' in value terms. This view of the world 
percolates into the discourse through the pro-
cess whereby the basic concepts are defined.58 
The alleged objectivity to which Viner refers 
[see footnote 57] simply cannot exist in the pro-
cess of formulation of hypotheses or, still more 
broadly, of the basic questioning which is the 
starting point for the analysis. Max Weber pro-
vided a particularly telling explanation of this 
essential point: "There is no absolutely 'objec-
tive ' scientific analysis of culture —or put per-
haps more narrowly but certainly not essential-
ly differently for our purposes— of 'social phe-
nomena ' which is independent of special and 
'one-sided' viewpoints whereby —expressly or 
tacitly, consciously or unconsciously— these 
phenomena are selected, analysed and orga-
nized for expository purposes".59 
Thus , for example, it must be intuitively 
obvious even to anyone completely ignorant of 
economic theory that the distribution of mone-
tary income cannot be unconnected with the 
power relationships which stem from the social 
structure, and that it in turn exerts influence on 
the structure of relative prices and on the con-
crete process of attributing value. However, it 
was in the notion of general equilibrium, based 
on the analysis of 'real' magnitudes, that the 
This does not mean that social science is 'a matter of 
opinion' , since these views of the world ultimately gene-
rate hypotheses which are susceptible ot empirical proof. 
5 9 Max Weber, "'Objectivity' in social science", in his 
collection of essays The Methodology of the Social Sci-
ences, trims. Edward A. Shils and Ilenrv A. Finch (Glencoe, 
111., Free Press, 1949), p. 72. 
most widely held theories of value found solid 
common ground on which obvious scope for 
communication was established. Consequent-
ly, economic theory is only now 'rediscovering' 
this intuitively obvious fact. Thus Maurice 
Dobb observes, as one of the principal conclu-
sions of his analysis of theories of value and 
distribution, that the structure of demand in the 
market can only be derived from the wishes, 
preferences or behavioural reactions of con-
sumers, on the assumption that consumers 
have a specific amount of monetary income. 
Hence, he continues, implicit in the general 
process of price formation is an initial distribu-
tion of income between individuals, in the 
sense that this distribution must be included as 
one of the determinants of the structure of de-
mand, from which all prices derive (including 
the prices of the factors of production); the 
whole process of price formation is related to 
this postulated distribution. In other words, 
concludes Dobb, a theory of distribution, if 
conceived as a theory of prices derived from 
productive services, cannot be independent of 
the initial distribution of income, as an essen-
tial premise.™ 
Dobb then focuses his attacks on the neo-
classical theory, and endeavours to 'absolve' 
Marx and the classical economists. However, 
they too omitted to ascribe due importance to 
monetary flows and the distribution of nominal 
income in the process of attribution of value. 
At all events, Marx deserves special con-
sideration, since his view of the world places 
power relationships and the struggle between 
irreconcilable social classes at the heart of his 
conception of the historical process. However, 
he performed the feat of combining this all-
embracing view with a theory of value founded 
on conditions of general equilibrium. 
When the concept of stable equilibrium is 
abandoned, the validity of those theories in 
formal logic does not disappear, but their prac-
tical importance does. Economic value ceases 
to be regulated by forces 'inside' the economic 
W) Maurice Dobb, Teoría del Valor y de la Distribución 
desde Adam Smith (Ideologia \i Teoria Económica), trans, 
Rosa Cusininskv de Cendren) (Mexico City, Siglo XXI, 
1975), p. 47. The first English edition dates from 1973. 
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system itself (average social labour, or the mar-
ginal preferences of consumers), which bring it 
to equilibrium, and it becomes the expression 
of the power relationships which stem from the 
social structure. It is these power relationships 
which, in the final analysis, determine the cri-
teria governing the distribution of technical 
progress and of monetary income. 
As history shows without a single excep-
tion, human beings need to find a rational justi-
fication and an ethical legitimation for their 
behaviour. In order that these justifications and 
legitimations can be placed within an authen-
tically humanistic perspective, at the service of 
all men in the full measure of their individual-
ity, it is necessary to discover the hidden forms 
of power and show clearly the social responsi-
bility of those who control its mainsprings. 
